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Improving access to capital for low wealth households is a vital part of any rural 
development strategy, especially one designed to rectify long standing rural inequality 
and to generate broadly-based growth.  In addition, there may be further benefits from 
specifically targeting the capital needs of rural and low-income women.  Most credit 
programs oriented to increase access to credit for poor households are based on a “gender 
neutral” approach. However, unless specifically targeted, women tend to have inferior 
access to financial resources than do men. This differential deserves special consideration 
from policy makers given presumed social welfare and productivity gains to be had from 
specifically enhancing women’s productive capacity within the household. 
This paper introduces the rationale for enhancing women’s access to capital, documents 
the particular factors that constrain women’s credit access from conventional financial 
intermediaries, and presents a review of the international experience with women-
targeted credit programs. Finally, it reviews the position of rural women in Colombia 
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   2ENHANCING RURAL WOMEN’S ACCESS TO CAPITAL: 
WHY IT IS IMPORTANT AND HOW IT CAN BE DONE 
 
SECTION I: Introduction. Why Specifically Target Rural Women’s Access to Capital?  
 
Improving access to capital for low wealth households is a vital part of any rural 
development strategy, especially one designed to rectify long standing rural inequality 
and to generate broadly-based growth (Hauge et al., 1999).  In addition, there may be 
further benefits from specifically targeting the capital needs of rural and low-income 
women.  After introducing the rationale for enhancing women’s access to capital in this 
introduction, Section II documents the particular factors that constrain women’s credit 
access from conventional financial intermediaries.  Section III presents a review of the 
international experience with women-targeted credit programs, providing an overview of 
institutional options and their strengths and weaknesses.  Section IV then turns 
specifically to the position of rural women in Colombia, while Section V focuses on the 
Colombian financial sector and the position of women within it.  Section VI closes this 
report with conclusions and recommendations about what can be done to enhance 
women’s access to capital in Colombia. 
  
So why specifically target women’s access to capital? We could be content with 
implementing “gender neutral” programs oriented to increase access to credit for poor 
households. After all, households with a female head (which are frequently towards the 
poorest end of the wealth spectrum) would likely benefit from a program of this sort; and 
for households with a male present he could obtain the loan and, presumably, do what is 
best for his family. 
 
However, the logic for specifically targeting women’s access to capital rests on two inter-
related points that dispute these too easy presumptions: 
 
First, seemingly gender neutral credit programs are more likely to be gender blind than 
really gender neutral as they may simply fail to reach women-headed households. This 
problem can be attributed to: 
 
i)  Women’s particular structural conditions such as having to fulfill multiple 
household tasks and take care of their children; their high poverty rates; etc. 
 
ii)  Credit market failures that adversely affect poor women because of their 
specific characteristics.  Unless specifically targeted, poor women’s economic 
conditions and needs do not match what traditional financial institutions 
generally offer. 
 
Second, there are presumed pay-offs in terms of poverty alleviation, and improved 
economic efficiency by improving women’s access to capital. This view is often referred 
   3to as the “instrumental” approach to incorporating gender in development policies.
1 Two 
major elements of this idea are that: 
i)  women are viewed as productive agents instead of needy beneficiaries (Boserup, 
1970); and, 
ii)  it does matter who in the household receives the additional resource (in this case, 
capital). 
 
While this first point is relatively straightforward, the second is perhaps less so. To 
further develop this argument, it is essential to examine the manner in which families 
make decisions and allocate their resources. I present a brief introduction to the current 
thinking on intrahousehold decision making process in the next several paragraphs and a 
more complete summary on the research on the importance of women’s position within 
the household in the appendix. 
 
Households can be thought of as microeconomic units that, through their production and 
consumption decisions, choose how to best allocate their resources (labor, assets, etc.). 
The process by which households make decisions has been modeled in several different 
ways, depending on the assumptions made about preferences and resource-handling 
within the household (Haddad et al., 1997).  
 
Unitary models of household decision-making assume that families can be viewed as 
economic units with a single set of preferences and that household resources and 
information are fully shared. If households behave as if they were one unit, women would 
not have additional problems in their access to capital. That is, it would suffice to design 
a credit program that improves poor households’ access to financial resources, without 
taking into consideration which member of the family is the actual loan recipient. Unitary 
models, however, have been widely criticized for not taking into consideration that 
preferences may, in fact, not only be different across family members—in particular 
between men and women—but, moreover, they may not be aggregated in any simple way 
(Folbre, 1984). 
 
Collective models of household decision-making, on the other hand, view families as 
collections of individuals who both cooperate and may have conflicting interests. They 
are based on the notion that the heterogeneity in family members’ preferences is resolved 
through a bargaining process. According to this approach, “household decisions” depend 
both on family members’ preferences and on their relative bargaining power (Sen, 1990; 
Folbre, 1984).  
 
Within the collective models, the “non-cooperative bargaining” approach may constitute 
a particularly attractive alternative to modeling household decision-making. Non-
cooperative models are based on more flexible and more realistic assumptions about the 
way in which families operate: 
                                                           
1 One could also argue for the need of designing policy that would reach women because women deserve 
the same benefits as men, or because women (poor women) need special help. The extensive literature 
presenting this position offers a wide array of reasons to provide assistance to women, ranging from purely 
altruistic or egalitarian motives to economic or political self-interest (Razavi, 1997; Jacquette, 1990). 
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ii)  family members may not pool their income;   
iii)  families may make decisions that are Pareto-inefficient. That is, overall household 
production or well-being could be improved by merely reallocating its resources 
without making any family member worse-off. 
 
Recent empirical works based on non-cooperative bargaining models of household 
decision-making have found that household resources were, in fact, inefficiently allocated 
(Udry, 1996; Doss, 1994). These inefficient outcomes arise, at least partly, from 
enforcement problems and imperfectly shared information between family members (see 
Katz, 1997; Carter and Katz, 1997).   
 
Under this scenario, “intrahousehold inefficiencies” would affect household behavior 
and, as a result, it would matter who in the household receives new access to economic 
resources—in this case, to capital. Enhancing women’s access to capital is likely to 
strengthen their bargaining power within their families and consequently to affect 
households’ decisions. Women’s improved access to capital may, for instance, reduce 
intrahousehold inefficiencies improving food consumption, children’s education, and 
family health care. 
 
If that were the case, credit programs that target poor women could represent 
improvements over programs that simply target poor households because, by making a 
positive difference for women, they may constitute a cost-effective way to induce 
economic growth, to reduce poverty, and to improve nutrition, health, and education 
indicators. There is thus a strategic complementarity between women-targeted and more 
general credit programs. 
 
In summary: 
 Unless specifically targeted, women tend to have inferior access to financial resources 
than do men. 
 There may be additional social welfare and productivity gains to be had from 
specifically enhancing women’s productive capacity within the household.  
 
SECTION II: Market Failure  --  Women in the Credit Market 
 
Almost everywhere in the world that poverty has been studied, results show a 
disproportionate number of women to be poor. This is the case whether poverty is 
defined in terms of income or by other indicators, such as ill health, inadequate nutrition, 
little or no education, or lack of leisure time. Although absolute figures change 
dramatically depending on the measures used, women’s representation among the poor is 
higher than men’s in all cases (Buvinic, 1997). 
  
It is not surprising that women are persistently found among the poorest of the poor, 
given that social or cultural norms often create an uneven playing field and prevent them 
from participating in economic activities on an equal basis. Women have traditionally 
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social norms are strong enough to explicitly exclude women from working in specific 
areas but, more frequently, the constraints imposed are more subtle. 
 
Women’s income is consistently lower than men’s (Restrepo and Reichmann, 1995; IDB, 
1990; Berger, 1989); and their employment possibilities and their opportunities for 
starting or enlarging their own microenterprises are constrained by a variety of factors. 
Some of the explanations are:  
i)  women’s supply of labor may be intermittent or restricted to the type of work that 
can be done at home because of their childbearing and childrearing 
responsibilities (Almeyda, 1996; Pitt and Khandker, 1995; Mencher, 1988);  
ii)  women may not have access to information on alternative projects they could 
work on;  
iii)  in populations with deficient diets, women may not ingest the necessary nutrients 
and may thus be more vulnerable to health problems, particularly those related to 
pregnancy and lactation (Mencher, 1988).  
 
Additionally, women-headed households typically display a higher dependency ratio—
more consumers per income earner—which places them towards the lower end of the 
wealth spectrum (Buvinic, 1997; Restrepo and Reichmann, 1995; IDB, 1990; Berger, 
1989). This is a particularly important concern given that the number of women-headed 
households is increasing in developing countries (Buvinic, 1997). 
 
As a result of their (frequently) adverse structural position, women often encounter the 
same credit market imperfections that rural poor have to face. As Hauge et al. (1999) 
carefully explain, most of these obstacles can be aggregated into four categories: 
a)  Some of the costs involved in a loan are independent of the amount lent. These 
transaction costs include both the money and the time spent, for example, on the 
paperwork for the loan application and repayment process. Since transaction costs are 
fixed, regardless of the size of the loan, they affect smaller borrowers more than 
proportionally. 
b)  Poor borrowers are limited in the type or amount of collateral they can offer. Lacking 
traditionally accepted guarantees, they are often compelled to pay higher interest rates 
for credit.  
c)  Lenders need to gather information about the borrowers in order to estimate their risk 
of default. Since the cost of obtaining this type of information may be high and is not 
proportional to the size of the loan, smaller loans are less attractive to lenders.  
d)  In any setting where contracts are difficult to enforce, lenders face a higher risk of 
default which, coupled with potentially higher costs and delays, turns lending into a 
less attractive activity. Consequently, lenders might increase their rates or, in more 
severe cases, find it not worthwhile to offer loans at all. 
 
Although poverty, in itself, is a very serious obstacle for women attempting to get credit, 
there are also imperfections of the financial markets that specifically constrain women’s 
access to credit. These obstacles stem from legal, social, cultural, and economic 
restrictions; they make traditional financial programs unsuitable for women even when 
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credit market imperfections that affect women, in particular, can be classified into three 
groups:  
i) institutional  constraints;   
ii)  supply-side constraints; and  
iii) demand-side  constraints. 
 
2.1. Institutional Constraints 
 
Institutional constraints are legal regulations or social norms that condition the type of 
economic activities women can engage in and the extent of women’s access to and 
control over resources. Such institutional constraints affect women’s access to credit by 
making it more difficult for women to fulfill the standard requirements for a loan, or by 
turning women into less profitable clients and discouraging lenders from transacting with 
them.  The most frequently cited institutional constraints are: 
 
IC-1) Women are particularly limited in their access to, or control over, resources that 
could serve as collateral. This results, at least partially, because:  
a)  Property rights are biased against women. Although now most countries have 
rectified unequal treatment, a few countries still have agrarian and/or civil codes that 
limit women’s access to and control over property. This is a critical problem because 
it limits the availability of collateral for women and, consequently, hinders their 
access to credit (Deere and Leon, 1997).  
Until only a few years ago, married women in countries like Chile, The Dominican 
Republic, Bolivia, Peru, and Brazil could not buy, sell, or rent land; and the law 
granted a woman’s husband full control over all her resources, including assets that 
she may have owned prior to the marriage (Alvear Valenzuela, 1987).  
Inheritance laws in some societies give preference to male relatives; and, in some 
instances, ignorance of legal inheritance rights results in women losing their land to 
male relatives (Lycette and White, 1989). 
The situation is even more dramatic for women who have partners but are not legally 
married. In most countries, they do not have legal access to any of the property their 
partners own, nor are they counted among the beneficiaries when their partners die. In 
other words, even when they are part of a household owning enough titled land, 
women may not be able to use it as collateral to obtain loans.  
Finally, the agrarian reforms of the last couple of decades, with few exceptions such 
as the reforms in Cuba and Nicaragua, have allocated land to “household heads.” 
And, conforming to the family farm stereotype in which male heads of household are 
the principal breadwinners, they have excluded most women from the possibility of 
benefiting directly (Deere and Leon, 1997; Lycette and White, 1989; Deere, 1987; 
Boserup, 1970). 
b)  In poor households, any property that could be offered as collateral is likely to have 
already been pawned. This is because men are usually perceived to be engaged in 
more profitable activities and are typically the main income providers.  
c)  Women also face a disadvantageous position when businesses or salaries are accepted 
as collateral. Since women’s businesses are usually in more traditional and less 
remunerative activities, their enterprises are typically not viewed as very valuable 
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less likely to have the documentation of formally registered businesses (ANUC, 1998; 
ANMUCIC, 1998; Lycette and White, 1989). When regular salaries are used, women 
as a group are at a disadvantage, once again, because they tend to work in sectors 
with the lowest pay levels. 
 
IC-2) Women may be prevented by law from applying for loans by themselves. Some 
legal codes establish that married women can apply for loans from financial institutions 
only if they are represented by their husbands or have been explicitly authorized by them 
(Alvear Valenzuela, 1987). 
 
In countries where married women’s rights are limited and are conferred to their 
husbands (as a direct consequence of IC-1 and IC-2), women applying for a loan would 
have to involve their partners in the transaction, thereby losing control of the project and 
reducing their decision-making power. 
  
IC-3) Women use different sources of information. In most societies, women do not use 
(or have access to) the same information channels as men. Consequently, their lack of 
knowledge about available funds and application procedures prevents them from taking 





2.2. Supply-Side Constraints 
 
Supply-side constraints are obstacles in women’s access to credit that originate from 
biased lending practices. Such constraints are particularly frequent in traditional financial 
institutions but may appear, to a lesser degree, even in some of the alternative financial 
institutions. Supply-side constraints may arise from financial institutions’ perception of 
women as small and inexperienced borrowers and, as such, less attractive clients (Lycette 
and White, 1989). Or, they could occur simply because lack of more specific knowledge 
about female clients prevents lending institutions from offering products tailored to 
women’s needs.  Among the most important supply-side constraints are: 
 
SC-1) Transaction costs can have an adverse impact on women’s borrowing capacity. As 
previously mentioned, fixed transaction costs—money and time involved in applying for 
and repaying loans—have a disproportionally negative impact on the poorer borrowers. 
Transaction costs are higher when borrowers are far from financial institutions, when 
repeated visits are required, when banks’ business hours are inconvenient, and when 
extensive paperwork is involved. The negative impact of transaction costs on women’s 
borrowing ability is even more complex, given that women asking for loans will typically 
                                                           
2 A study of the financial sources for women microentrepreneurs in Chile found that “…women were less 
aware than men of financial institutions and instruments such as loans available. Women identified fewer 
sources of finance and were more misinformed than men regarding collateral requirements and types of 
enterprises financed by commercial banks.” (in Almeyda, 1996:46). 
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roles.”  Moser (1993) defines women’s reproductive roles as:  
 
“… the childbearing/rearing responsibilities and domestic tasks undertaken by women, 
required to guarantee the maintenance and reproduction of the labor force. It includes, not 
only biological reproduction but also the care and maintenance of the workforce (husband 
and working children) and the future working force (infants and school-going children).” 
Moser (1993: 29) 
 
The magnitude of this double burden varies, depending on the composition of the 
household and the household lifecycle (Restrepo and Reichmann, 1995). The more 
demanding their reproductive roles are, the more valuable their time is at home; and it 
follows that long travel distances, inconvenient schedules, and complicated procedures 
become greater obstacles in their access to credit (Baydas et al., 1994; Lycette and White, 
1989; Reichmann, 1984). 
 
SC-2) Traditional financial institutions’ collateral or guarantor requirements tend to be 
ultimately biased against women. As previously argued, in many societies women do not 
have legal access to land; even when they do, social norms often do not confer them 
control over those assets, limiting their use as collateral (Kurwijila and Due, 1991; 
Reichmann, 1984).  When guarantors are required, women are often not treated equally, 
either (Baydas, 1994). In many cases, female guarantors are not accepted and, in some 
instances, it can be very difficult for a woman to obtain a male guarantor (ANUC, 1998).  
This is made all the more difficult by specific program requirements that limit guarantors 
to sponsoring one loan at a time (ANUC, 1998). 
 
SC-3) Women are sometimes required to have a male relative supporting their decisions. 
There are financial institutions that explicitly require that women have their loan 
applications co-signed by their husbands (if married) or their fathers (otherwise) 
(Almeyda, 1996; Berger, 1989; Reichmann, 1984). Even when there are no such policies 
at the institutional level, married women in smaller and tighter communities are usually 
denied credit. That is because bank employees—typically male—would be overstepping 
a friend’s dominion by giving credit to his wife, without prior consent from her husband 
(Ospina, 1998).  
 
SC-4) When procedures and requirements for obtaining loans are not clear and widely 
known, bank employees responsible for loan approvals may frame them as special favors. 
The most common methods of repaying those favors, such as inviting loan officials for a 
drink or for dinner, giving bribes, etc., are not considered acceptable behavior for women 
(Ospina, 1998; Lycette and White, 1989).  
 
2.3. Demand-Side Constraints 
 
Demand-side constraints, in turn, include all those obstacles that may inhibit women from 
applying for loans, even when there are funds that are available to them. Some of the 
demand-side constraints are: 
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DC-1) Poor rural women tend to undertake projects that are more traditional and that 
render lower levels of return (Almeyda, 1996; Rhyne and Holt, 1994; Restrepo and 
Reichmann, 1995; Morris and Meyer, 1993). Their choice of project is often bounded by 
norms indicating what type of activities are socially acceptable for women, and by the 
extent to which their reproductive roles limit their mobility and time availability. Other 
extremely important factors preventing women from switching to more profitable sectors 
are often overlooked; these are: the absence of innovative role models, the lack or 
inadequacy of information about other activities they could potentially engage in, and the 
tendency of those providing technical assistance to guide women to traditionally female 
projects.  
 
DC-2) Even when women have a project that could be profitable and attractive to lending 
institutions, they may be unable to prepare an adequate feasibility study and would 
thereby be unqualified to obtain loans (Lycette and White, 1989). This is likely to be a 
consequence of women’s lower literacy levels and lack of experience with financial 
institutions. Women’s educational level—particularly women old enough to engage in 
income-generating activities—varies widely across countries (Almeyda, 1996). However, 
even though girls’ literacy rates have significantly increased in the last couple of decades, 
women’s literacy levels tend to be lower than men’s (Almeyda, 1996; Baydas et al., 
1994; Morris and Meyer, 1993; Lycette and White, 1989; Reichmann, 1984). On the 
other hand, even literate women may feel intimidated and less confident in applying for 
loans from traditional financial institutions when they have not had previous credit 
experience (Kurwijila and Due, 1991; Weidemann, 1992; Reichmann, 1984). 
 
DC-3) Poor women, especially those in households close to the survival margin, give 
primary importance to satisfying the basic needs of their children and themselves. Hence, 
they might not apply for credit because they are more averse to risk and fear debt 
(Almeyda, 1996; Morris and Meyer, 1993). 
 
As a result of these complex sets of constraints, poor rural women may not be able to 
obtain as much credit as they would have liked from traditional financial institutions, or, 
they may not receive any credit at all. One of the difficulties in assessing the magnitude 
and effects of these financial market imperfections is that a significant number of women, 
assuming that they would be rejected, may actually self-select themselves out and decide 
not to apply for loans. Some women may be choosing not to apply for credit, based on a 
correct assessment of their chances; that is, they do not have the type of project, income, 
collateral, guarantors, etc., requested by lenders (Baydas et al., 1994). This is a case of 
potential clients not meeting lenders’ requirements, either because they are not attractive 
customers or because lenders do not offer products that suit women’s specific needs and 
characteristics.  Other women may decide not to apply for loans because they believe that 
they would be denied credit when, in fact, they meet all the requirements needed to be 
approved (Baydas et al., 1994). This problem arises mainly because of lack of adequate 
information. In some instances, women may not even know that there are funds available 
and how to apply for them (Baydas et al., 1994). 
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access to collateral, reproductive roles, high poverty rates, etc.) coupled with financial 
market imperfections that affect women (poor women’s economic conditions and needs 
that do not match what traditional financial institutions generally offer) shape women’s 
demand for credit and the type of financial services that may, or may not, be offered to 
them.  
 
SECTION III:  Institutional Options and Experience for Targeting Credit to Women 
 
The analysis in this section aims to provide a brief description of the different types of 
financial institutions, their attributes, and the methods they use to compensate for the 
information problems that characterize credit markets.
3 As we are interested in women’s 
access to credit, the review will focus on how these different types of financial 
institutions reach (or do not reach) resource-poor women.  However, as Almeyda (1996) 
points out, many institutions do not disaggregate information by gender, because they 
claim that they do not have “discriminatory” policies. Consequently, it is difficult to 
obtain the type of information that would be more relevant for this study, particularly in 
the case of the more traditional financial institutions.  
 
Whenever possible, this review will highlight the number of women reached by different 
institutions and women’s share among their clients. However, it should be emphasized 
that it is as important (if not more) to analyze the characteristics of:  
i)  women who were not able to receive as much credit as they would have liked to;  
ii)  women who did not receive credit at all; and,  
iii)  women who decided not to apply for loans.  
Unfortunately, information of this kind can only be elicited from specifically designed 
surveys which, as far as I know, have not been carried out in the region. 
 
Another very important dimension to analyze is the impact that the types of loans 
provided by the different institutions can have on their clients’ income and well-being. 
Unfortunately, this is a considerably more difficult task for at least three different 
reasons. First, funds from different sources can be clumped together. Second, most 
households are involved in multiple activities. Third, it is likely that households that 
borrow funds will share characteristics that induce specific types of outputs (for instance, 
if households that apply for loans are those that are more willing to take risks, those same 
households may also be more likely to adopt riskier but higher-yielding new 
technologies). All these considerations impose great difficulty when trying to identify the 
real impact that a particular loan may have on the current situation of the household. One 
way of proceeding requires the use of sophisticated econometric techniques; which 
demands the use of very detailed data that is rarely available and very expensive to 
obtain. Not surprisingly, there is far less information on the impact of credit programs 
than there is on programs’ outreach.  
                                                           
3 For a more exhaustive analysis of the different financial institutions, the segment of the market they serve, 
the market imperfections that most affect them, and a review of their performance in Latin America, see 
Hauge et al., (1999). 
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Finally, for each type of institution, I present some case studies. Given the somewhat 
limited information on financial institutions that are making special efforts to reach 
women, I am unable to focus exclusively on the degree to which each type of financial 
institution reaches rural women in Latin America. This review will therefore also include 
urban experiences and cases from other regions of the world. While acknowledging that 
these cases are not fully comparable, I believe they still provide valuable information. 
 
The financial institutions to be analyzed are classified into four groups: i) formal lenders; 
ii) informal lenders; iii) cooperative financial intermediaries; and iv) alternative financial 
institutions. This last group refers to credit programs implemented by NGOs and includes 
both group-based methods (such as solidarity groups and village banking) and individual-
based programs.  
 
3.1. Formal Lenders 
 
Formal lenders are financial intermediaries whose activities are regulated and supervised 
by, for example, the Superintendence of Banks. They include agricultural development 
lenders, state or privately owned banks, state programs that offer credit to small farmers, 
etc. Their infrastructure, organization, and abundant resources allow them to provide 
wide coverage, to diversify their portfolio, and thereby to be less vulnerable to shocks 
caused by bad weather or by low agricultural prices. Formal lenders tend to rely on 
traditional methodologies for loan approvals, screening borrowers through formal credit 
records and paperwork, and relying on collateral assets to guarantee loans. Their high 
transaction costs and collateral requirements typically leave an important segment of the 
population unable to obtain loans (Hauge et al., 1999).  
 
Poor women find themselves particularly excluded from financial transactions with 
formal institutions in three important ways. First, as discussed in section II, property 
rights are biased against women in many societies.  As a result, poor women are even less 
likely than poor men to be able to provide the types of collateral that formal financial 
agencies traditionally require. Second, the higher opportunity cost of women’s time 
relative to men’s magnifies the negative effects of the (typical) geographic dispersion of 
the lending offices, their inconvenient office hours, and the complicated application 
procedures. Finally, women’s frequent lack of business experience may make dealing 
with formal financial institutions such an intimidating task that it dissuades them from 
applying for loans (Morris and Meyer, 1993; Weidemann, 1992; Buvinic and Berger, 
1989).  
 
Nevertheless, recent empirical evidence in Latin America indicates that some commercial 
financial institutions are expanding their services to smaller producers in general. In fact, 
even though small loans generally represent only a modest share of  their portfolio, the 
total volume that commercial banks lend to microproducers is often comparable to (or 
larger than) what other financial institutions like NGOs offer (Almeyda, 1996). More 
specifically, some banks have adjusted their practices in order to be able to reach more 
women. Studies have found that the proportion of women among borrowers in 
   12commercial banks is similar to the proportions served by alternative programs 
implemented by NGOs (Almeyda, 1996; Baydas et al., 1994).
4 
 
Almeyda (1996) reports another important finding: potential clients (microentrepreneurs) 
lack information about financial institutions and, consequently, make incorrect 
assumptions about these institutions’ requirements for loans. Banks are generally 
believed to charge higher interest rates, demand real estate as collateral, and offer only 
large loans. Yet this was found not to be the case for many of the formal institutions 
interested in microcredit that were reviewed in the study.
5 Lack of information about 
formal financial institutions and incorrect assumptions regarding the services they offer 
were more prevalent among women.  
 
The common findings that women resort to the formal financial sector less frequently 
than men, and that they receive smaller loans than men when they do apply, point to the 
need for a careful examination of the potential explanations for these results. Only 
empirical research can shed light on whether the gender differences result from 
institutional constraints, supply-side constraints, demand-side constraints, or a 
combination of the three. Baydas et al.’s (1994) study of Ecuadorian formal credit 
markets has found that, contrary to common beliefs, women are at least as likely as men 
to apply for loans and that, once they apply, they are at least as likely to receive them. 
They are, however, more likely than men to receive loans that are smaller than applied 
for. Baydas et al. (1994) conclude, therefore, that the problems that women face in their 
access to formal credit may not be the result of supply-side problems, and that effective 
solutions would have to extend beyond the financial sector. It should be noted, however, 
that this study is based on microentrepreneurs who had participated in special assistance 
programs. That is, the participants already were engaged in some type of productive 
activity and, as such, are probably not representative of those segments who self-select 
themselves out of the formal financial markets. 
 
We shall now turn our attention to evidence from a number of specific formal financial 
institutions and the varying degrees to which they serve women. We have, on the one 
hand, the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) with its general credit program KUPEDES. This 
bank has successfully moved from being a state-owned bank that operated with 
government subsidies, to becoming a profitable privately-owned bank with more than 
3000 financially self-sufficient branches (Boomgard and Angell, 1996; WWB and ICWC, 
1995). Even though BRI works within the rural sector, its loans are not limited to 
agriculture-related activities. It is viewed as a very successful experience, not only 
because of its remarkable growth, but also because of its outreach: 15.1% of KUPEDES’ 
borrowers were below the poverty line and 73% were landless or nearly landless. 
Unfortunately, results regarding female borrowers are not as favorable: while the average 
                                                           
4 It is important to note that the case studies reviewed by Almeyda (1996) refer for the most part to urban 
areas and, as such, these findings may not mirror the behavior of formal financial institutions in rural areas. 
5 This does not rule out the possibility that these assumptions hold for formal financial institutions in 
general. The institutions included in the study in question were selected on the basis of having  “some 
experience in providing microcredit” (Almeyda, 1996:20). It is therefore not clear how representative they 
are of the overall population of formal financial institutions. 
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23% of the borrowers (Boomgard and Angell, 1996; WWB and ICWC, 1995). Four 
reasons have been suggested to explain women’s low level of participation: i) in some 
regions of Indonesia, women do not engage in the type of activities financed by 
KUPEDES; ii) some of the (male) officers have prejudice against lending to women, 
even though women’s repayment records have been extremely good; iii) most of the field 
workers are men, who may not fully understand women’s needs; and iv) in those cases 
where collateral is required, customary religious laws regarding property ownership are 
biased against women (WWB and ICWC, 1995). 
 
Two urban-based Latin American banks, Bandes in Chile and Pacifico in Ecuador, on the 
other hand, offered a more gender-balanced picture. In keeping with their institutional 
commitment to reach the lower-income groups, more than 50% of their outstanding loans 
were smaller than US$5000—Bandes’ average loan was US$988 and Pacifico’s was 
US$239 in 1992 (Almeyda, 1996).
6 Contrary to the generally held belief among 
microentrepreneurs surveyed by Mehech (in Almeyda, 1996), these institutions do not 
require collateral to give loans. In fact, co-signature is the most frequent type of 
guarantee, and they use their clients’ repayment history to determine their 
creditworthiness.
7 Their flexibility in terms of types of collateral accepted and their 
competitive interest rates
8 help explain women’s higher participation levels: in 1992, 
women received 50% of the outstanding loans in Bandes, and 44% in Pacifico (Almeyda, 
1996). 
 
3.2. Informal Lenders 
 
Informal lenders can be classified into two rather loose categories, according to their 
connection to the borrowers and their rationale for lending. On the one hand, there are 
friends, relatives, neighbors, etc. that lend based on solidarity and implicit reciprocity. 
These lenders do not typically require any collateral, nor do they charge interest on the 
loan. This is essentially an informal social insurance scheme by which lenders attain a 
right to reciprocity that they can demand in the future (Zeller and Sharma, 1998). On the 
other hand, informal lenders also include moneylenders. Moneylenders are able to reach 
borrowers that do not have access to formal credit by using their personal knowledge of 
the clients as a screening mechanism. Instead of relying on collateral, familiarity with the 
clients allows them to minimize fraud and other problems of contract compliance. At the 
same time, their monopolistic position allows them to charge considerably higher interest 
rates. 
From the lenders’ perspective, the risk of not recovering a loan is very low, because they 
lend only to persons within their social network, where contracts can be enforced. By 
dealing directly with a lender that knows them, borrowers can avoid lengthy appraisal 
processes, complicated paperwork, long travel time, and confusing loan terms. The 
                                                           
6 Even then, less than 5% of their portfolio is invested in microcredit loans (Almeyda, 1996). 
7 Bandes also uses the solidarity group methodology that will be discussed later (Almeyda, 1996). 
8 Their effective real interest rates were similar to (or lower than) those charged by the NGOs and Credit 
Unions included in the study (Almeyda, 1996). 
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on the source, high interest rates) imply that they are more likely to be used to finance 
short-term activities, such as guaranteeing minimum consumption levels during bad times 
or providing working capital.  
 
Given that several features of the informal sector partially mitigate problems that women 
face in the formal financial sector, poor women in developing countries frequently resort 
to informal lenders. Their geographic proximity constitutes a valuable advantage for 
women who generally lack time and are less mobile than men. In addition, informal 
lender’s flexibility in terms of loan size, collateral requirements, and repayment schemes 
better match women’s needs and economic position. In fact, Zeller and Sharma (1998) 
find that although women are less likely to apply for loans and are more likely to be 
constrained in the formal sector, that is not the case in the informal financial sector.  
 
However, reliance on informal lenders also presents problems:  
i)  interest rates are high (in the case of moneylenders);  
ii)  women may have to partially relinquish control over their decision-making to the 
lenders (in the case of family or friends); and, 
iii)  funds from these sources are uncertain and limited. Since informal lenders 
typically rely on their own funds and rarely take deposits, their supply of credit is 
limited. This implies that some of the potential borrowers who are willing to take 
loans at the given rates will not have access to funds, or that they will have to pay 
even higher interest rates (Zeller and Sharma, 1998). 
 
3.3. Cooperative Financial Intermediaries (Credit Unions) 
 
Credit unions constitute one of the main sources of financing for small producers in 
developing countries (Magill, 1996). They are membership-based institutions that are 
typically regulated through national cooperative legislation. Membership is restricted to a 
group of people that share a common characteristic or bond. Close-bond cooperatives are 
those in which members have links such as working for the same organization,  
belonging to the same church, etc.; open-bond cooperatives are those which restrict 
membership to people living in the same geographic area. These common ties guide the 
type of services that the cooperatives provide but, more importantly, they decrease credit 
risks (Almeyda, 1996; Magill, 1996).  
 
Traditionally, in order to obtain a loan from a credit union, borrowers not only need to be 
members (shareholders), but also to save a percentage of the loan in the credit union for a 
specified period of time. Through this requirement, credit unions are better able to screen 
borrowers to reduce risks and avoid requiring collateral assets. To guarantee loans, credit 
unions rely on co-signers and savings (Almeyda, 1996; Magill, 1996). Credit unions tend 
to charge interest rates that are higher than those of most formal institutions, but lower 
than those of NGOs (Almeyda, 1996). Given that borrowers are required to meet some 
minimum savings requirement, credit unions typically cannot reach the poorest of the 
poor. However, in most cases, those requirements are fairly low (Magill, 1996). By 
disregarding collateral requirements and providing a friendlier environment in which 
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become an attractive alternative for women (Almeyda, 1996). 
 
I will describe three credit unions in this section: SEWA from India, Coocique from 
Costa Rica, and Progreso from Ecuador. SEWA is a cooperative bank created in 1974 to 
provide women with an alternative to moneylenders by addressing some of the problems 
that women faced when they tried to get funds from the existent formal financial 
institutions.  This cooperative targets poor, self-employed women, including agricultural 
workers. Although it started as an urban institution, SEWA was authorized to operate in 
rural areas from 1993 onwards. Today, 17% of its borrowers work in agriculture (WWB 
and ICWC, 1997). SEWA has been able to overcome some of the most notable barriers 
poor women confront in dealing with financial institutions: i) it offers a very informal 
atmosphere, having all female employees; ii) the loan applications are short, clear, and 
simple, and the staff helps with filling out the forms; iii) signatures are replaced by thumb 
impressions and pictures; iv) in most cases, SEWA does not ask for collateral; borrowers 
are, instead, required to open a savings account and to buy bank shares in proportion to 
the amount of their loans.
9 As of 1997, SEWA is a profitable institution with 
approximately 15,000 outstanding loans and an average loan size of US$142 (WWB and 
ICWC, 1997). Their relatively high repayment rate, 96%, is the result of close contacts 
with their clients and their strong follow-up procedures (WWB and ICWC, 1997). 
 
Coocique began operating in 1965 and today is Costa Rica’s largest credit union. 
Branches are located in rural areas, and 11% of its total volume of loans is for 
agricultural projects. At the end of 1992, it had roughly 1,000 outstanding loans, with an 
average size of US$1,560 per loan. Although notable, the level of women’s participation 
in this credit union is still moderate: 37% of their members are women, and 30% of the 
loans are granted to women (Almeyda, 1996). 
 
Progreso, created in 1969, is an open-bond cooperative with an urban clientele of more 
than 30,000 members. By December of 1992, it had close to 3,500 outstanding loans with 
an average size of US$874 per loan. Although women account for only 30% of its 
membership, they received 48% of the loans. It should be noted, however, that 92% of 
loans given to women were of less value than US$1,000 (Almeyda, 1996). 
 
3.4. Microfinance Programs 
 
An impressive number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) around the world 
have undertaken the task of filling some of the void left in the financial markets by 
commercial banks and credit unions. As a result, they have developed and implemented 
credit methodologies that specifically target low-income people, most of which have 
successfully reached women. NGOs tend to offer shorter-term loans, charge higher 
interest rates than commercial banks, require alternative forms of collateral, and provide 
(sometimes optional) training. 
 
                                                           
9 They do accept non-traditional forms of collateral (such as jewelry), and presenting collateral speeds up 
the loan granting process (WWB and ICWC, 1997). 
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but also on creating sustainable institutions. The methodologies developed by 
microfinance programs take advantage of local information and peer pressure to reduce 
the incidence of default, and they provide repayment incentives, such as loans increasing 
in size, based on borrowers’ credit history. Some specialized microfinance programs are 
group-based; others deal with clients on an individual basis. 
 
3.4.1. Individual-Based Programs 
 
These programs rely on a combination of techniques from traditional commercial banks 
and informal lenders that better suit poorer borrowers’ needs. They reduce the sometimes 
insurmountable burden of transaction costs by locating their agencies closer to their 
clientele. Since most of the potential borrowers lack the types of collateral traditionally 
required, NGOs usually take a more flexible approach. They frequently rely on clients’ 
credit histories, providing clients with only very small loans initially and increasing the 
size of the loans, based on satisfactory repayment behavior. The may depend on co-
signers or personal references—or on clients’ saving history, if the institution offers 
saving services. 
 
ADOPEM (The Dominican Association for Women Development) is a successful 
example of this type of program. It has been operating in the Dominican Republic since 
1982 and lends to more than 50,000 women. To obtain funds from ADOPEM, the 
borrower must run a business that has been in existence for at least 6 months, and at least 
50% of its employees have to be women. This program, affiliated to Women’s World 
Banking, combines individual lending and solidarity groups and reaches over 10% of the 
poor women entrepreneurs of the Dominican Republic (WWB and ICWC, 1997). In fact, 
approximately 70% of ADOPEM’s borrowers are in the bottom 50% of those living 
below the national poverty line (Microcredit Summit, 1997). Most of its clientele are 
located in urban areas and employ less than 5 people. ADOPEM charges an effective 
interest rate of 30%, has an average loan of US$400, and has very low default rates 
(Microcredit Summit, 1997; WWB and ICWC, 1997). ADOPEM is financially self-
sufficient and accepts substitutes of traditional collateral such as personal guarantors or 
other assets. 
 
3.4.2. Group-Based Programs 
 
Group methodologies were developed in order to eliminate some of the problems of 
traditional lending, primarily the disproportionately high transaction costs of small loans 
and the collateral requirements that exclude large sectors of the poor population from the 
financial markets. From the lending institutions’ viewpoint, lending to groups allows 
them to clump together the members’ individual loans, lowering their administrative 
costs. These costs are passed on to the groups, which are entirely responsible for 
distributing, monitoring, and collecting the loans.  Group approaches allow borrowers 
who do not have sufficient collateral to obtain loans from the formal financial system to 
get credit based on social collateral or joint liability. 
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spread and obtain information through a group; this is an extremely important feature for 
women, given that in some societies women are excluded from formal networks. In 
certain cultures, interaction with (typically male) agents from the lending institutions may 
be more acceptable if done through female groups than with individual women. Finally, 
by working in groups, members learn from their peers, develop skills, and improve their 
self-confidence. This is expected to sharpen their decision-making skills and to encourage 
them to undertake new economic activities. 
 
3.4.2.1. Solidarity Groups 
 
The solidarity group approach is probably the most widely-spread of the new 
microfinance methodologies designed to reach the poor. In Latin America, the solidarity 
group approach was pioneered by ACCION International. Solidarity groups are typically 
self-formed and include 3 to 8 members. Joint liability implies that if one or more 
members of the group defaults, the whole group is denied credit in the future. The 
resulting peer pressure constitutes a very effective (and relatively inexpensive) 
mechanism to induce prompt repayment. 
 
One of the most famous solidarity group programs is BANCOSOL in Bolivia. 
BANCOSOL is probably the first private commercial bank in the world that is 
exclusively devoted to microentrepreneurs (Weidemann, 1992). BANCOSOL grew out 
of a very successful NGO, PRODEM, that started in 1987 and decided to become a bank 
in 1992, in order to be able to capture savings to be able to meet the overwhelming 
demand for credit (Glosser, 1996; Weidemann, 1992).
10  
 
BANCOSOL operates with groups of 4 to 8 microentrepreneurs that have run businesses 
for at least a year. Group members apply for individual loans but co-guarantee all the 
loans of the group. Although this program was not intending to target women 
specifically, 65% of its credit officers and 70% of its clients are women (WWB and 
ICWC, 1997; Glosser, 1996). BANCOSOL borrowers are mainly market vendors (70%) 
or work in the manufacturing or service sectors (30%). According to 1997 figures, 
BANCOSOL loans varied from US$100 to US$5,000 in size, with an average of 
US$687; the repayment rate of 98% was very high. Loans are of very short terms 
(weekly, biweekly, or monthly), and the effective interest is 32% (WWB and ICWC, 
1997; Microcredit Summit, 1997; Glosser, 1996). 
 
Another NGO working with the solidarity group methodology since 1988 is PROPESA. 
PROPESA operates in Chile, covering the capital and its proximities, as well as Regions 
V, VI, and VIII. With over 6,000 borrowers, this NGO has one of the largest market 
shares of loans to microenterprises in Chile (Microcredit Summit, 1997). PROPESA’s 
average loan is US$305, and they are allocated to trade activities (57%), manufacturing 
(37%), and services (6%) (Almeyda, 1996). PROPESA charges interest rates that are 
                                                           
10 PRODEM continues to exist and is currently experimenting with lending technologies in rural areas. 
Rather than focusing on microenterprises, it emphasizes support to family economies, the provision of 
loans for agriculture, electrification, housing, etc. (Restrepo and Reichmann, 1995).  
   18comparable to those from commercial banks and presents a high repayment rate 
(Almeyda, 1996). This program has a comparatively low level of female participation; in 
1992, women received slightly over 40% of their loans (Almeyda, 1996). 
 
3.4.2.2. Village Banking 
 
Village banking, the most successful methodology to extend financial services to rural 
women worldwide, was first developed in the 1980s in Latin America. Many village 
banks serve only women and, according to a comprehensive study of 68 such programs 
by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (1996), women constitute 95% of 
the membership of village banks around the world.  The village bank methodology is 
more than a purely financial system; it encourages local empowerment via an integrated 
approach that includes special training and takes full advantage of the benefits derived 
from working in groups. 
 
Although the specifics vary slightly with each application, the village bank methodology 
provides financial services to the poor and women, based on terms that were especially 
designed to match their requirements and their most frequently expressed needs. They 
provide small loans for short terms but, at the same time, require small but regular 
savings. Women, who often do not have much previous credit experience, feel more 
comfortable taking loans that satisfy their working capital needs without exposing them 
to unnecessary risks. According to UNIFEM, the average loan size for village banks in 
Latin America is US$91, which is significantly lower than the loan sizes of the other 
financial programs reviewed in this study. 
 
The shorter term of the village bank loans is yet another feature that is favorable to most 
women. By matching more closely the economic cycle of some of the economic activities 
women typically engage in (e.g., petty trading), village bank programs facilitate women’s 
good repayment performance. These small loans with frequent payments would typically 
imply extremely high transaction costs and would threaten the sustainability of most 
programs. The village bank methodology, however, attenuates these otherwise 
insurmountable costs by: i) aggregating these very small individual loans into a larger 
group loan; ii) giving the village bank managers the task and responsibility of 
administering the individual loan transactions; iii) standardizing loan products and loan 
processing; iv) minimizing the cost of training and technical assistance (UNIFEM, 1996). 
 
Although extensive outreach is one of the main goals of the village banking philosophy, 
sustainability becomes a central goal if resources are to be channeled to the poor in an 
enduring fashion. Thus, the village banking methodology strongly emphasizes the 
importance of self-sufficiency, and the fact that some village banks have achieved 
operational self-sufficiency seems to show that this is a realistic goal (UNIFEM, 1996). 
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1 Number of programs with 90% operational self-sufficiency or more. 
 
In the UNIFEM sample, the programs that achieved operational self-sufficiency were 
older, and those that exhibited lower levels of self-sufficiency were newer; that is, they 
found a positive correlation between age of program and self-sufficiency (UNIFEM, 
1996). Additional characteristics of village banks’ clientele that have a major impact on 
their level of operational self-sufficiency are: 1) the degree of literacy and education of 
the members—the higher these are, the more capable the members will be to manage 
their own projects and the village bank; 2) the geographical location of their members—
serving rural areas entails higher costs because more time and transportation are needed 
to cater to a more scattered population; 3) the economic activities their members are 
engaged in—business activities in rural areas tend to be less diversified and therefore 
represent riskier portfolios (UNIFEM, 1996). 
 
With respect to financial self-sufficiency, the UNIFEM study reports that “while village 
bank programs may often face costs which exceed their income, village banks themselves 
are usually financially self-sufficient, whether they are in new or old programs” 
(UNIFEM, 1996:53). Village banks are able to achieve financial self-sufficiency because 
they generally charge interest rates that cover their full costs (namely, costs of operation, 
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by commercial banks. Practitioners estimate that an average village bank that operates 
according to these guidelines can be self-sufficient within a period of three to five years. 
 
The ultimate goal of the village bank philosophy is to boost the self-confidence and 
develop the skills of the program beneficiaries so that they (mainly women) can 
overcome some of the constraints they frequently face. Beneficiaries not only would gain 
financial experience that can help them deal with the more traditional formal institutions, 
but they could also engage in new economic activities. In the short term, they would 
develop a community-owned financial institution that allows them to undertake projects 
and build experience. With those goals in mind, program beneficiaries are required to 
work in (mostly single sex) groups that meet regularly. 
 
The characteristics of village banks—their credit terms (small loans with frequent 
payments), their higher interest rates, and their strong emphasis on group solidarity and 
social support—provide a self-selecting mechanism which guarantees that they will work 
only with the poorest segments of the population. These are precisely the people who 
cannot obtain credit under more favorable conditions on their own.  
 
Two of the village bank programs that are successfully operating in Latin America are: 
CAM (Center for Microenterprise Support) in El Salvador, and CARE Women’s Village 
Banking Program in Guatemala. The CAM program, which started in 1990, is affiliated 
to FINCA International—the NGO that pioneered the philosophy of village banking. 
CAM serves two types of clients: i) microentrepreneurs that wish to start their own 
business or that have very small enterprises and ii) a lesser number of larger 
entrepreneurs that are still small enough not to have access to commercial bank loans 
(WWB and ICWC, 1995). By 1997, the CAM clientele consisted of over 14,000 
microentrepreneurs, and CAM expects to be able to reach 20,000 microentrepreneurs in 
the near future. More than 80% of their current clients are women, and 85% of them 
reside in rural areas (Microcredit Summit, 1997; WWB and ICWC, 1997). CAM does not 
offer loans for manufacturing or agriculture; its goal is specifically to improve the 
economic and social conditions of low income families involved in small businesses. 
 
CAM lends to more than 700 village banks, each one formed by 20 to 50 household 
heads (typically women) with joint liability. The village banks are responsible for lending 
to their members (WWB and ICWC, 1997). Loans are offered for periods of between 
four to twelve months and average US$350. Approximately 80% of their first-time 
borrowers are below the national poverty line, and the average first loan is of only US$70 
(Microcredit Summit, 1997). CAM exhibits a very high repayment rate of 98%, 
according to the WWB and ICWC report (1997). In order to participate in the program, 
potential clients have to plan to establish a business, offer some type of collateral, and 
participate in the training sessions that are provided at no cost.  
 
CARE Women’s Village Banking Program diverges from the original village bank model 
developed by FINCA. CARE strongly emphasizes its commitment to improving 
outreach. As a result, the number of borrowers in the program has increased considerably 
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to isolated rural areas, in a country with insufficient and badly maintained roads, helps 
provide rural women with access to financial resources that would otherwise be too 
costly because of the transaction costs; but this entails higher operational costs (World 
Bank-SBP, 1997). In addition, due to the lack of social services, literacy rates in these 
areas are low and, as a result, training is a substantial component of the CARE program. 
CARE has adjusted the village banking program in order to provide smaller but longer 
term loans. However, World Bank-SBP (1997) found that, in regions that were primarily 
engaged in agricultural activities, most women would have liked to obtain larger loans 
and for a longer period of time that would match the agricultural cycle.  
 
CARE Women’s Village Banking Program performance has improved steadily and its 
loan repayments are very high. Still, it is not a sustainable program, nor will it be in the 
near future, unless important changes are made (World Bank-SBP, 1997). At present, the 
program benefits from services provided by CARE—the organization that created it—
such as an excellent management information system, centralized accounting services, 
and office space. These very desirable services represent, however, higher overhead costs 
and tighter donor dependency which, coupled with a poorer and less educated clientele 
and high transaction costs derived from offering small loans, become serious obstacles on 
the road to sustainability (World Bank-SBP, 1997).  
 
3.5. Linking Constraints with Lending Institutions 
 
To conclude this general overview, Table 3.2 explicitly links some of the main obstacles 
constraining rural women’s access to credit (from Section II) with the different types of 
lending institutions (from Section III). 
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Constraints  Formal Lenders  Informal Lenders  Credit Unions  Microfinance Programs 
IC-1 
Women are particularly 
limited in their access to, or 
control over, resources that 
could serve as collateral. 
Although this obstacle originates from legal regulations or social norms, the magnitude of its negative impact depends upon the 
type of collateral required by each type of lender (see constraint SC-2 below). 
IC-2 
Women may be prevented by 
law from applying for loans 
by themselves. 
If this were the case, women 
would be able to access funds 
from formal lenders only 
through men. 
If this were the case, informal 
lenders—who are not 
regulated by law—may be the 
only alternative for women 
who want to take loans by 
themselves. 
If this were the case, women would be able to access funds 
from these institutions only through men. 
 
IC-3 
Women use different sources 
of information. 
For the most part, formal 
lenders do not actively reach 
for new, small clients.  
In some cases, lack of 
accurate information leads 
women to believe their 
conditions (interest rates, 
collateral requirements, etc.) 
are stricter than they actually 
are. 
Women have access to 
information on at least some 
informal lenders. 
This constraint is less likely to be a problem in dealing with 
credit unions and microfinance programs.  
SC-1 
Transaction costs can have an 
adverse impact on women’s 
borrowing capacity. 
Transaction costs tend to be 
high given that formal lenders 
typically are geographically 
farther, have inconvenient 
office hours, and require 
complicated paperwork. 
Transaction costs tend to be 
very low. Informal lenders do 
not require complicated 
paperwork and 
geographically close.  
Credit unions and microfinance programs tend to be closer to 
their clientele and have a more flexible approach.  
However, credit unions and group-based programs typically 




institutions’ collateral or 
guarantor requirements tend 
to be ultimately biased 
against women. 
Formal lenders tend to rely on 
traditional forms of collateral 
that women are less likely to 
be able to provide. 
Informal lenders use personal 
knowledge to screen clients 
and social pressure to enforce 
repayment. As a result, 
typically, they do not require 
collateral; and, when they do, 
Collateral requirements are 
weaken but, in order to 
receive loans, individuals first 
need to become members of 
the credit union and, in most 
cases, also need to have 
Microfinance programs tend 
to substitute traditional 
collateral for repayment 
incentives and peer-
monitoring. 
In group-based programs, 
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objects. 
savings in the institution.  credit is provided based on 
social collateral and joint 
liability. 
SC-3 
Women are sometimes 
required to have a male 
relative supporting their 
decisions. 
Although this is rarely an 
explicit requirement, this 
obstacle can be frequently 
observed in formal 
institutions. 
This is not a problem for 
consumption loans from 
informal lenders. However, it 
may appear more strongly in 
the case of productive loans.  
This is not necessarily an 
issue with credit unions. 
However, an additional 
obstacle for women with 
partners arises when credit 
unions allow only one 
member per family. 
This is less likely to be a 
problem in microfinance 
programs and especially in 
group-based programs. 
SC-4 
When procedures and 
requirements for obtaining 
loans are not clear and widely 
known, bank employees 
responsible for loan approvals 
may frame them as special 
favors that women cannot 
repay. 
Even though procedures 
themselves may be better 
defined in formal institutions, 
those procedures may not be 
widely known because of 
their more formal interaction 
with the clients. 
The dynamics under which 
lending occurs reinforce 
lenders’ (family members’ or 
moneylenders’) power over 
borrowers. 
This is less likely to be a problem in dealing with credit unions 
or microfinance programs because of their friendlier approach 
to clients. 
Nonetheless, interacting with (typically male) agents from the 
lending institutions may be more acceptable if done through 
female groups than by women individually. If that were the 
case, group-based programs present an advantage for women. 
DC-1 
Poor rural women tend to 
undertake projects that are 
more traditional and that 
render lower levels of return. 
Formal lenders are likely to 
be the ones offering the 
cheapest credit. However, 
their interest rates may still 
turn most traditional projects 
unprofitable. 
This is a significant problem 
with moneylenders who, as a 
result of their monopolistic 
position, charge much higher 
interest rates. 
Unless subsidized, credit from credit unions or microfinance 
programs is more expensive than that from formal institutions.  
On the other hand, these programs may encourage women to 
undertake new and, presumably, more profitable economic 
activities. 
DC-2 
Women may be unable to 
prepare an adequate 
feasibility study. 
This may be a serious 
obstacle and can intimidate 
women in their dealing with 
formal lenders. 
Feasibility studies are not 
required by informal lenders. 
These institutions tend to provide help/assistance with 
preparing feasibility studies. 
DC-3 
Women may be more averse 
to risk and fear debt. 
Given their, typically, less 
friendly environment, formal 
lenders tend to heighten 
potential clients’ fear. 
Fear of default is likely to be 
a significant problem for 
women dealing with 
moneylenders. As a result, 
women might take loans from 
informal lenders only when 
badly needed. 
Since these programs often include technical assistance, 
women may view the project as less risky than otherwise. 
Moreover, group support may lessen this constraint because, 
by working in groups, members learn from their peers, 
develop skills, and improve self-confidence. 
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and, in particular, how they relate to the most common obstacles constraining rural 
women’s access to capital around the world, I will now concentrate on the Colombian 
case.  
 
SECTION IV: Rural Women in Colombia 
 
Rural women constitute approximately 15% of the total Colombian population (Caro, et 
al., 1997). Available measures of rural women’s contribution to the economy, however, 
are very inadequate. For instance, by the current definition of the Economically Active 
Population (EAP), only 35% of the adult women are considered economically active 
compared to 77% of the men (Caro, et al., 1997). In fact, Gaitan and Rugeles (1996) 
estimate that, partly because of this, 1.2 million women have not been included in 
policies or programs aimed to provide relief to the agricultural sector.  
 
In 1993, 17.1% of rural households were headed by women (Deere and Leon, 1997). It is 
important to note, however, that the relatively high percentage of female-headed 
households in rural Colombia does not necessarily signal an empowerment of women. 
Data from a 150-household survey, implemented by IICA in 1993, reveal that 18.5% of 
the participant households were headed by women, but a significant number of those 
households did not have a male member present. Only 10% of the women interviewed 
were household heads and had a partner (Gaitan, 1996). 
 
Table 4.1. Distribution of Rural Households by Per Capita Income-Decile. 
 
















1  83.7 16.3 77.5 22.6 
2  81.7 18.3 77.7 22.3 
3  83.7 16.3 84.1 15.9 
4  85.8 14.2 85.6 14.4 
5  82.0 18.0 83.1 16.9 
6  85.1 14.9 82.2 17.8 
7  81.8 18.2 77.8 22.2 
8  79.2 20.8 77.6 22.4 
9  76.9 23.1 76.8 23.2 
10  83.4 16.6 80.9 19.1 
Total  82.3 17.7 80.3 19.7 
Source: Caro, et al. (1997), based on the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares Rurales, 1995 and 1988 
 
The feminization of poverty, a frequent concern in many countries, does not seem to be 
occurring in Colombia. According to a World Bank poverty study, other things being 
equal, a Colombian female-headed household is not more likely to be poor than a male-
headed one (Caro, et al., 1997). Except for the country’s Pacific area, proportionately less 
female-headed rural households are poor than male-headed households. Nonetheless, as 
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increased from 16.3% and 18.3% in 1988 to 22.6% and 22.3%, respectively, in 1995 
(Caro, et al., 1997). 
 
Another indication of women’s position in rural Colombia can be derived from the 
gender distribution of land ownership among small producers. In the absence of more 
general results, I will refer only to data from the IICA study. In their sample, land 
ownership was attributed to women in 24% of the cases, to men in 42% of the cases, and 
was jointly held in 34% of the cases. This indicates that men have formal ownership of 
their land more frequently than women do. However, if we include the cases of joint 
ownership, women are formal owners in 58% of the households. This percentage is 
significantly higher than women’s observed level of participation in income-generating 
activities and their access to credit. Thus, Gaitan (1996) concludes that although land 
titles warrant formal ownership, they may not carry with them de-facto rights. 
 
4.1. Socio-economic Status of Women in Colombia 
 
In order to better understand rural women’s financial needs in Colombia, it is imperative 
to take a closer look at the types of activities they engage in and at the types of decisions 
they make or do not make. Most peasant women have three types of responsibilities: 
productive, reproductive, and communal. 
 
Analysis of the data from the IICA 1993 survey reveals that, on average, rural women 
dedicate 6 hours to productive activities, over 7 hours to reproductive activities, and 0.1 
hours to communal activities per day (Gaitan, 1996). In other words, women tend to 
spend 45% of their working time on productive activities. Table 4.2. provides a more 
detailed description of women’s daily activities.  
 
An interesting fact is that women’s productive activities are, contrary to men’s, quite 
diverse.  According to the 1995 National Survey of Rural Households (ENHR), 78.7% of 
men reported agriculture as their primary activity, followed by wage labor. By contrast, 
only 12.5% of women declared agriculture as their main activity. Women reported 
industry, commerce, and services as their primary occupation in 42%, 53%, and 65% of 
the cases, respectively (Caro, et al., 1997; Gaitan, 1996). However, as Caro, et al. (1997) 
points out, it is important to note that these figures refer to respondents’ primary 
activities. They may, therefore, ignore women’s participation in activities that can fall 
within what they perceive to be their domestic chores (e.g., raising small animals). 







Productive Activities  6.17  45.0 
    Agriculture  2.47   
    Animals  1.60   
    Transf. of agric/animal products  0.78   
    Wage labor  0.46   
    Crafts  0.40   
    Trade  0.32   
    Other activities  0.14   
Study 0.04  0.3 
Communal Activities  0.10  7.3 
Reproductive Activities  7.39  53.9 
Total 13.70  100 
Source: Gaitan and Rugeles, 1996, based on the 1993 IICA Survey. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4.3. uses data from the IICA survey to provide an indication of men’s 
and women’s relative contributions to each type of activity. According to this 
information, men do not participate in the processing of agricultural or animal products, 
nor do they make crafts. Women are also responsible for most of the animal husbandry. 
And, as it has been reported in all the relevant literature on the topic, women carry most 
of the burden in domestic work. 
 
Table 4.3. Men and Women’s Relative Participation in Daily Activities. 
 
Activity Men  Women 
Agriculture        57.8%       42.2% 
Animals        32.2%       67.8% 
Transf. of ag/animal prod.          0%     100.0% 
Wage labor        65.1%       34.9% 
Crafts          0%      100.0% 
Trade        49.0%        51.0% 
    
Domestic work          4.4%        95.6% 
Source: Gaitan and Rugeles, 1996, based on the 1993 IICA Survey. 
 
A broadly accepted finding in the literature on rural Colombia asserts that rural women’s 
participation in productive activities is stable and permanent. While it is affected by male 
migration, civil or military conflicts, and other temporary problems, it is not merely a 
response to them (Caro, et al., 1997; Gaitan, 1996; Campillo, 1996). 
 
As far as communal activities go, women tend to participate more in health committees 
and men to be involved with communal boards and production-related organizations 
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organizations (Gaitan, 1996). 
 
Table 4.4. Men and Women’s Relative Participation in Communal Activities. 
 
Activity Men  Women  Others 
Health Committees        19.5%       51.9%       28.6% 
Communal Boards        52.9%       20.6%       26.5% 
Production Organizations        50.0%       33.3%       16.6% 
Others          0%       80.0%       20.0% 
Total        35.7%       38.9%       20.0% 
Source: Gaitan and Rugeles, 1996, based on the 1993 IICA Survey. 
 
In addition to the information on women’s participation in different types of activities, 
the IICA 1993 survey also provides important information on women’s role in decision-
making. Interestingly, the data indicates that the proportion of women that stated making 
production decisions (19.1%) is roughly the same as that which reported being the 
household head (18.5%). Men were reported as making the household’s production 
decisions in 44.3% of the cases; 36.6% of the households reported joint decision-making. 
A more accurate picture emerges, however, when instead of thinking of the household’s 
principal decision-maker, we examine who typically makes each type of decision within 
the household. Women report making decisions regarding the products to be consumed 
by the household, raising small animals, household management, food manufacturing 
(such as jams, cheese, etc.), and craft-making. Men, on the other hand, are typically 
responsible for deciding what and how much is going to be produced and sold, and how 
production resources are allocated. In other words, men are more likely to make 
production decisions, while women are more likely to make reproduction decisions 
(Gaitan, 1996).  
 
4.2. Legal and Institutional Changes in the Position of Rural Women in Colombia 
 
The poor performance of Colombia’s agricultural sector in the 1980s, and the resulting 
insufficient supply of basic food, fostered the introduction of drastic policy changes. 
Colombia became one of the first Latin American countries to implement a policy 
specifically designed to help peasant women. The goals of this policy were to promote 
women’s access to resources and to education, and to encourage the formation of 
women’s organizations. Unfortunately, these efforts had very limited reach, and the 
policy was mostly abandoned when the government changed (Caro, et al., 1997; Gaitan, 
1996; Campillo, 1993). 
 
Nonetheless, one of the positive outcomes of this period—in which severe agricultural 
problems were coupled with conflicts with drug traffickers and paramilitary groups—was 
the creation and strengthening of peasant movements. Of particular importance is the 
creation, in 1985, of the National Association of Peasant and Indigenous Women 
(ANMUCIC). The group’s initial objective was to promote the development of projects 
oriented to increasing the income levels of rural women. Shortly after its formation, 
however, ANMUCIC realized that, to make a difference, it also needed to be active on 
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discrimination against women by ensuring that women’s rights were explicitly 
recognized and that women were able to participate in decisions. At the same time, 
ANMUCIC undertook a project at the national level to guarantee that rural women would 
become aware of their rights, and also that women themselves demanded the enforcement 
of those rights (Leon and Deere, 1997).  
 
Social and economic peasant organizations, such as ANMUCIC, are very strong in 
Colombia today. Unfortunately, as powerful as they are, they still have a long way to go 
before they reach most of their target population. In fact, the IICA survey found that only 
40% of the households in their sample were involved in some type of communal 
organization.  
 
In the early 1990s, thanks to the political support of high-ranking government authorities 
and of international organizations, important changes favoring women were introduced in 
the legislation. These changes have improved the rights of women in general, of female-
headed households, and of women in consensual unions (and their children). Some of the 
most important provisions for women introduced at the time are (Deere and Leon, 1997): 
 Law 54 of 1990, a Civil Code amendment, guarantees equal rights regarding joint 
patrimony and inheritance to both partners regardless of whether they are legally 
married or members of a consensual union. For instance, upon the death of a man, 
his wife or partner is entitled to half of their joint patrimony; the rest is inherited 
in equal parts by all the (legal and natural) children. 
 The National Constitution of 1991 states that “Women and men have equal rights 
and opportunities. Women cannot be subjected to any type of discrimination” and  
that “The State will provide special assistance to women who are household 
heads.”  
 Law 82 of 1993 acknowledges the existence of female household heads and 
establishes explicit measures to guarantee their well-being.  
 
Furthermore, in 1993, the government implemented EPAM, a policy promoting women’s 
participation and equity towards women by requiring a gender perspective in all the 
government policies, programs, and projects. Specifically, EPAM formally recognized 
that at all institutional levels women and men had different access to resources and that 
institutional supply should therefore be adjusted accordingly in order to guarantee equal 
access (Caro, et al., 1997). A year later, in 1994, the Policy for the Development of Rural 
Women was implemented. This policy aimed to improve rural women’s welfare by 
recognizing their major role in the development process, their triple responsibilities 
(being in charge of productive, reproductive, and communal tasks), and the inequalities 
they face (Gaitan, 1996). 
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Colombia has—as have most other Latin 
American countries since the1960s—undergone a land reform program which has 
increased women’s access to land, the most typical form of collateral. Interestingly, in 
Colombia, the agrarian reform laws have, over the last decade, granted women a 
markedly more favorable treatment than the one they (implicitly) receive in most other 
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11  It is important to mention that Agrarian Law 30, approved 
only10 years ago, explicitly granted women four basic rights (Deere and Leon, 1997): 
 single women who were heads of household could be the direct recipients of 
agricultural plots for their families and would have preferential treatment in the 
distribution of unutilized national lands;  
 women were to receive land titles jointly with their partners, regardless of 
whether they were legally married or permanent companions;  
 women were granted the right to be included among their husband’s heirs; and, 
 women’s organizations were to have equal participation in regional and national 
committees of the Colombian Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA).  
 
Unfortunately, the introduction of these rights was not enough to improve women’s 
position noticeably. Although the total number of plots awarded under Agrarian Law 30 
increased, the proportion of women among the beneficiaries did not change, remaining at 
11% at the national level (Deere and Leon, 1997; Gaitan, 1996).
12 It is impossible to 
make any serious evaluation of how this law affected women with partners, given that the 
available data does not explicitly consider joint titling; those plots are probably counted 
as being given to the men (Deere and Leon, 1997; Gaitan, 1996). 
 
That a law granting such basic and important rights to women failed to make the agrarian 
reform more favorable to them, provides meaningful evidence of the considerable gaps 
between legally-granted rights and those observed in practice. There seems to be a 
general agreement that the main obstacles with Law 30 were problems related to its 
implementation (Deere and Leon, 1997). Most of the difficulties arose out of INCORA’s 
bureaucracy, civil servants’ ignorance of Law 30’s provisions, and general male 
opposition to grant these rights (Deere and Leon, 1997).  
 
In 1994, a new Agrarian Law (Law 160) was sanctioned. The main provisions affecting 
women’s status as land reform beneficiaries were (Deere and Leon, 1997): 
 the selection criteria for beneficiaries was modified so that certain categories of 
women received the maximum number of points, giving them priority in the land 
redistribution. Women included in this group were female household heads and  
women who were socially or economically “unprotected” (for instance, women 
that were widowed or abandoned because of the intense political conflicts). 
 the notion that land assigned to households should be titled jointly was reinstated, 
thereby reinforcing land rights of women with partners. 
 ANMUCIC was allowed to participate in the board of directors of INCORA and 
in the regional and local committees that select land beneficiaries and are 
responsible for implementing the agrarian reform. 
 
However, there are still aspects of this law that can pose problems for women. For 
instance, only credit-worthy persons are eligible as beneficiaries. This implies that 
                                                           
11 For an in-depth analysis of the Agrarian Reforms in Latin America, see Deere and Leon (1997). 
12 In some regions, like in the Risaralda Valley, the number of plots allocated to women did increase but the 
average size of plot received by women was significantly smaller than in the past. (Deere and Leon, 1997). 
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plot of land if their former partners had defaulted on a loan (Deere and Leon, 1997).  
 
4.3. Problems that Indirectly Affect Rural Women’s Access to Capital in Colombia 
 
This section identifies a number of important factors which negatively affect rural 
women’s credit access in Colombia. A particularly worrisome problem is the fact that so 
many rural women lack documentation. People who are extremely poor may not be able 
to afford trips to the state offices or to do the paperwork necessary to obtain proper 
documentation. Since men are more likely to be heads of household, to be involved in 
production-related decisions, and to benefit from state programs, women and children in 
households with limited resources are often not registered. As a result, in a significant 
number of cases, women’s interactions with institutions have to take place through other 
intermediaries (like their partners); or, even worse, they may simply not participate in 
social programs and thus not have access to the resources these programs provide. In a 
direct attempt to mitigate this problem, the Rural Women’s Office of the Department of 
Agriculture and Rural Development has started a campaign to provide documents to rural 
women (OMR-MADR, 1996). 
 
As far as formal education level is considered, the situation of women seems to be 
relatively similar to that of men. There are no important differences in illiteracy rates 
across genders. Comparisons of census data between 1988 and 1995 show that the 
proportion of women that passed to the next grade is slightly higher, and the proportion 
that abandoned school is lower, than the corresponding rates for men. Although this is a 
very favorable result for women, it is important to keep in mind the bigger picture: we are 
still talking about very low education levels. Men receive an average of 4.43 years of 
education, and women 4.61 (Caro, et al., 1997; Gaitan, 1996; CONPES, 1994; ENHR, 
1995 & 1988). Moreover, only 5.3% of the women surveyed in the IICA sample had 
reached the high school level (Gaitan, 1996).  
 
A significant difference between men and women is apparent, however, when we look at 
the recipients of technical assistance. Men tend to receive far more technical assistance 
than women. Within the households included in the IICA survey, 64.7% of the men had 
received technical training versus only 16.8% of the women (Gaitan, 1996). The slightly 
higher levels of formal education and the significantly lower levels of technical training 
may explain, at least partially, why so many more women work in commerce, services, 
and manufacturing, while most men work in agriculture (Gaitan, 1996). 
 
One of the main factors affecting women’s access to credit is their asset level. Within the 
land reform context, women’s position improved noticeably after Law 160 was 
implemented. The proportion of women who benefited directly increased from 11% to 
19.1% in 1995 and to 16% in 1996. More importantly, the increase in joint titling is 
extraordinary, going from 17.8% in 1995 to 57.2% in 1996 (Leon and Deere, 1997; 
INCORA).  
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13 
 
Year Total  Women  Men  Couples 
1995        4,172 
    (100%) 
        796 
    (19.1%) 
      2,632 
    (63.1%) 
       744 
   (17.8%) 
1996        3,863 
    (100%) 
        600 
    (15.4%) 
      1,061 
    (27.4%) 
     2,212 
   (57.2%) 
Source: Leon and Deere (1997). 
 
As encouraging as these results are, there are important caveats that need to be 
mentioned. Plots granted to women or couples were substantially smaller than those 
granted to men. For instance, the average plot sizes were smaller than 10 Has. for 
women, smaller than 14.5 Has. for couples, and larger than 17.5 Has. for men. Further, 
Pulido (1997) concludes from a survey of 881 peasant women leaders that 56% did not 
know how to apply for land through the agrarian reform program. This is an extremely 
high figure, if we consider that these women are leaders and that they could potentially be 
the ones disseminating information about these procedures to the rest. 
 
Table 4.6. Average Plot Size for Land Distributed in 1996 (in Has.) 
 
Year Women  Men  Couples 
Through Land Market  9.7  17.8  13.2 
State distribution  7.5  17.5  14.7 
Source: Leon and Deere (1997). 
 
Of even greater concern is the finding that the general results of this new agrarian law 
have been quite dismal. With slightly more than 4,000 beneficiaries per year, land 
distribution barely exceeds the yearly figures of ten years ago (Deere and Leon, 1997).  
 
In summary, a brief review of rural women’s position in Colombia reveals that:  
 the law does not discriminate against them; in fact, in some cases, the law 
explicitly favors women;  
 ANMUCIC is a strong organization that plays a very important role in 
strengthening women’s rights and the enforcement of these rights; and  
 women’s participation in production activities is significant and stable. 
 
However: 
 a critical number of women are excluded from any program, given that they lack 
“citizenship;”  
 women and men appear to have relatively similar—though still low—levels of 
formal education, but men receive far more technical assistance; and 
 over the last decade, significant changes have been introduced in the agrarian 
reform laws in an attempt to incorporate women into the process, with the impact 
of these changes being modest and the results mixed.  
                                                           
13 These figures refer both to land distributed directly by the state and through the land market. 
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The general overview having been completed, we can now turn to look specifically at 
women’s situation in the Colombian financial market. 
 
SECTION V: Women and the Financial Market in Colombia 
 
There is general consensus that in Colombia, as in all developing countries, access to 
financial resources is limited for the rural poor (see Hauge, et al., 1999, for a current and 
concise description of the financial market in rural Colombia). As I have argued, women 
tend to face additional obstacles in their access to credit; they are more likely to be credit-
constrained than men with similar resource endowments. In this section, I provide a more 
concrete depiction of women’s position in Colombia’s financial market. Although this 
study is about women in rural areas, the scarcity of lending experiences in rural areas and 
the lack of sufficient information prevent me from focusing exclusively on rural areas 
and force me to also include some urban experiences. 
 
The review presents two complementary positions: perceptions of borrowers (or potential 
borrowers), and characteristics of the institutions offering loans. First, I will describe 
women’s perception of their position in the financial market as (potential) loan recipients. 
Then, I will examine, from a gender perspective, the performance of some of the 
financial institutions most relevant for small producers in Colombia. 
 
5.1. Colombian Women’s Perception of Their Position in the Financial Market 
 
In this section I will review what women believe are the underlying factors affecting their 
access to credit. Using the framework presented in Section II, the analysis will categorize 




Institutional Constraints: Colombian laws do not discriminate against women. In fact, in 
some instances, as the agrarian reform law, they explicitly favor women. However, 
women’s legal property rights are, in practice, frequently ignored (Ospina, 1998). As a 
result, women often do not have property titles in their names and find themselves limited 
when those titles are required as collateral.  
 
Supply-Side Constraints: Women’s complaints revolve around four points (Ospina, 1998; 
Bonilla Castro, 1994): 
i)  Extremely high opportunity cost of the time involved in applying for loans. 
Women feel that this is particularly problematic for them given that their 
household responsibilities typically demand their constant presence at home; 
ii)  Excruciating delays in approval and disbursement of loans;  
                                                           
14 Two surveys provide a considerable amount of the information used for this review. The first one had 
national coverage and collected data from 881 female leaders of different social and peasant organizations. 
Results from this survey were analyzed by Pulido (1997) in a report for Oficina Mujer Rural—Ministerio 
de Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural. The second survey was based on a sample of 55 urban-based women 
microentrepreneurs who had and had not taken loans from a group of financial institutions. These data were 
analyzed by Bonilla Castro (1994) for an IDB project. 
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physical assets typically accepted as collateral. Being women, they have limited 
access to and control over household resources. The first of these two 
disadvantages—being poor—is a significant limitation in Colombia, as physical 
collateral is still the prevalent form of guarantee. This is so, even though the legal 
framework allows for alternative forms of collateral and a special guarantee fund 
(FAG) was created to help peasants overcome collateral requirements.
15 
The second handicap—being women—limits the collateral they can provide, even 
when they belong to families with assets that could be accepted by financial 
institutions. Besides, women seem to have very limited knowledge of the FAG’s 
purpose and the way it operates, so they rarely take advantage of it (Ospina, 1998; 
Pulido, 1997; Prada y Velandia, 1996). 
iv)  Their partners’ influence on their access to credit. In some cases, their partners’ 
credit histories are more important than the guarantees women could present 
(OMR-MADR, 1996). Moreover, in the more scarcely-populated and tightly-knit 
rural areas, women’s expected subordination to their partners creates an additional 
barrier when they apply for loans. Through informal conversations, women 
reported times in which they were required to provide, in addition to the standard 
documentation, an authorization from their partners because some (male) 
employees did not want to overstep their friends’ domain (Ospina, 1998).  
 
Demand-Side Constraints: Women reported being afraid of applying for loans. The 
application procedure seems too complicated to them and they fear not being able to 
repay their loans (Bonilla Castro, 1994). Women also presented some reticence to prepare 
feasibility studies. Their lack of experience in preparing feasibility studies turns an 
otherwise standard procedure into an extremely complicated task. Moreover, without 
adequate knowledge of the financial system, they do not fully comprehend the need for 
such documents (Ospina, 1998). 
 
Bonilla Castro (1994) found that women microentrepreneur resort to NGOs, credit 
unions, and input suppliers more often than they do to commercial banks. Within the 
group of microentrepreneurs that did not receive loans from formal financial institutions, 
women received funds from the informal sector twice as frequently as men (Bonilla 
Castro, 1994). They had resorted to the informal sector because moneylenders do not 
require complicated and lengthy paperwork, because they lack traditionally accepted 
collateral, and because loans are promptly disbursed. 
 
Pulido (1997) reports similar findings. A very worrisome result from that survey was that 
66% of the women that were interviewed had never applied for loans. This is a high 
figure if we consider that all the women in the sample were leaders of social or peasant 
organizations. Given the personal characteristics associated with being a leader and the 
presumption that those leaders have been more exposed to formal institutions, technical 
assistance, and training, one would expect that these women’s demand for capital would 
                                                           
15 Unfortunately, some officials of a large state bank (Caja Agraria) do not promote dealing with FAG 
because applying for guarantees from FAG is a cumbersome process and they believe using the guarantee 
fund encourages default (Pulido, 1997). 
   35be significantly higher than that of non-leaders. The study does not indicate the reasons 
why these women never applied for loans: were they not interested in receiving loans, or 
did they believe they would not qualify? If the latter were the case, were their perceptions 
correct? If they simply did not have a demand for capital there would be no need to make 
any adjustments. However, if this were not the case, it would be important to analyze 
what factors constrained them the most: insufficient collateral, inaccurate information, 
etc. 
 
The 881 female leaders in the study have presented a total of 327 loan applications, 
mainly to Caja Agraria and to members of the informal sector (Table 5.1). Since Caja 
Agraria offers the lowest interest rates, it is worth noting that only 35.2% of the 
applications were to Caja Agraria and that 31% of the applications to Caja Agraria have 
been denied. On the other hand, 26.3% of the loan applications were for the informal 
sector and only 4.6% of those were rejected (Pulido, 1997). 
 
Table 5.1. Loan Applications by Financial Institution. 
 








Caja Agraria         116        35.2         31.0 
Other Banks           41        12.5           7.3 
Informal Sector           86        26.3           4.6 
Cooperatives           58        17.7         15.5 
NGOs              8          2.4         25.0 
Others           18          5.5         38.8 
Total         327      100.0         18.6 
Source: Pulido (1997). 
 
When asked why their loan applications had been rejected, women reported the following 
reasons: lack of collateral (41%), lack of profitable projects (6%), other family members 
having outstanding loans (6%), other family members having defaulted a loan or being 
late with their payments (6%), small scale of their project (6%), lack of guarantor (6%), 
and no reasons given by lenders (16.4%) (Pulido, 1997). 
 
In order to guarantee their loans these women were required to present cosigners in 
39.6% of the cases, physical collateral in 23.3%, or were required to be clients before 
they could have access to loans in 14.6% of the cases. Finally, only 3.1% had used the 
guarantee fund (FAG) (Pulido, 1997).  The two most frequent requirements—cosigners 
and physical collateral—presented a critical barrier for these women’s access to capital. 
When asked what the most important obstacle in their access to credit was, 47% of the 
women interviewed reported finding cosigners and 31% being able to provide collateral. 
A smaller group mentioned the paperwork (10%) and the feasibility studies (6%) (Pulido, 
1997). Finding guarantors is even more difficult for women if they are (informally) 
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only one loan at a time (ANUC, 1998). 
 
5.2. Different Types of Financial Institutions and How Women Fit into Them  
 
Expanding financial services in order to reach small producers has been a long-time goal 
in Colombia. However, as in most countries, the approaches followed have varied over 
time. In the 70s and early 80s, the main objective was to reduce poverty. Capital was 
provided on a benevolent basis: interest rates were subsidized and defaults were often 
forgiven. Under this modus operandi, programs were not self-sufficient and eventually 
ran out of funds. By the late 80s, the strategy shifted towards increasing the productivity 
of small producers; training and technical assistance were emphasized. This approach, 
known in Colombia as the Carvajal methodology was promoted at national level by the 
National Plan for the Microenterprise in 1988. Unfortunately, it stumbled with problems 
because it failed to incorporate enough funding institutions and default rates were still 
high. 
 
Reforms introduced in the Colombian financial system in the early 90s promoted hard 
competition. Financial institutions had to search for unexplored segments of the market. 
As a result, there has been a concerted move towards lending to smaller enterprises. 
Today, however, instead of the more paternalistic approach of the past that emphasized 
outreach, financial institutions place high priority on their sustainability. Thus, the higher 
costs of providing funds to the rural areas—with less-known and geographically- 
dispersed markets—have effectively limited the enlargement of financial markets to 
urban and suburban sectors. So much so that in rural areas, the financial institution with 
the most territorial coverage is still a State bank: Caja Agraria. Although Caja Agraria 
currently has an important share of its portfolio in urban areas, it has branches scattered 
through very isolated places in Colombia. The extent of its coverage can be better 
appreciated if we note that there are 400 municipalities where Caja Agraria is the only 
institution providing financial services. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will analyze the extent to which some of the most 
relevant financial institutions offer their services to women. I have classified these 
institutions according to the lending methodology they apply (as in Section III) and will 
examine their portfolios from a gender perspective. When available, I will also include 
women’s opinions regarding the services these lenders provide. 
 
5.2.1 State Banks: Caja Agraria 
 
With its more than 800 branches and a portfolio in the order of $1200 billions Caja 
Agraria is, no doubt, the single most important financial institution in rural Colombia. 
Therefore, it looked very promising when Caja Agraria, following guidelines from the 
National Policies for Rural Women, allotted a special credit line for women. According 
to Table 5.2, the regional distribution of Caja Agraria’s loans to women is fairly even. 
Looking at the total number of loans, and according to Caja Agraria’s overall experience, 
they estimate the number of women participants to be 66,000. 
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Table 5.2. Regional Distribution of the Women-Portfolio – Caja Agraria 
November 1997 
        
                    Outstanding Loans                             Number of Loans 
 Total  ($) % Total % 
Antioquia         21,616,033,678  9% 9682 10% 
Arauca           2,447,002,771  1% 806 1% 
Atlantico           8,199,530,968  3% 2149 2% 
Bogotá         14,576,481,076  6% 3678 4% 
Bolivar           4,204,772,897  2% 1297 1% 
Boyaca         28,790,013,618  12% 12005 13% 
Caldas           8,371,284,918  3% 3711 4% 
Caqueta           4,670,166,632  2% 1163 1% 
Casanare           3,971,844,729  2% 1297 1% 
Cauca           7,302,512,193  3% 3297 3% 
Cesar           7,454,521,893  3% 2177 2% 
Cordoba         10,360,516,652  4% 2514 3% 
Cundinamarca         23,598,027,021  10% 10942 12% 
Huila           7,184,476,734  3% 3966 4% 
Llanos Orientales           7,817,486,781  3% 2291 2% 
Magdalena           7,805,673,914  3% 1822 2% 
Mocoa           6,902,154,475  3% 1698 2% 
Narinio           7,953,181,794  3% 5546 6% 
Norte  Santander           5,447,657,854  2% 2991 3% 
Quibdo           4,198,647,809  2% 1475 2% 
Quindio           4,070,744,214  2% 1567 2% 
Riohacha           5,734,905,957  2% 1520 2% 
Risaralda           3,935,356,071  2% 1340 1% 
Santander         11,414,951,137  5% 6766 7% 
Sucre           6,271,221,315  3% 1680 2% 
Tolima           9,079,347,026  4% 3704 4% 
Valle           7,451,256,800  3% 3268 3% 
Total        240,829,770,927  100% 94352 100% 
Source: Reico (1997). 
 
Unfortunately, without appropriate promotion, clear guidance, and support from other 
fronts, this special credit line did not yield the expected increase in female participation. 
Loans taken by women represent merely 20.1% of the total portfolio; a figure only 
moderately higher than the 16.5% reported over a decade before (see Table 5.3). In fact, 
the rate of participation by the end of 1996 was so low that the project was extended for 
another year. Aiming to boost women’s involvement, Caja Agraria and the Rural 
Women’s Office of the Department of Rural Development prepared materials that 
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  Number of Loans  Outstanding Loans 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
1984 81.1%  18.9%  84.3%  15.7% 
1985 82.2%  17.8%  85.2%  14.8% 
1986 85.2%  14.8%  83.5%  16.5% 
        
1997     79.9%  20.1% 
Source: Gaitan and Rugeles (1996) and Reico (1997). 
 
Two studies provide insights regarding women’s interaction with the Caja Agraria: the 
analysis by Gaitan and Rugeles (1996) based on data from the IICA-BID survey to 
female food producers, and the work by Pulido (1997), which specifically reviews 
bottlenecks in women’s access to funds from the Caja Agraria.  
 
Responses to the IICA-BID survey indicate a very high approval rate for loan 
applications presented to the Caja Agraria, i.e., above 90%. However, interviews with 
several related sectors (such as state offices, research institutions, development agencies, 
and users’ associations (ANUC, ANMUCIC, and INDI)) unanimously pointed to serious 
limitations in Caja Agraria’s ability to reach rural small and microproducers. The 
problems, they said, revolve around the bureaucratic, confusing, and sometimes arbitrary 
procedures, and the distressing delays in the loan application process.  
 
In the IICA sample, 60.8% of the loans were requested by men and 39.2% by women. 
Given that the approval rate is very similar for both groups, 95% for men and 91% for 
women, Gaitan (1996) concludes that there appears to be no discrimination against 
women in the credit operations of Caja Agraria. However, the picture is likely to be more 
complicated. Although similar approval rates are a good sign, they only attest to an 
apparently gender-neutral procedure once loan applications have been presented. It is 
easy to think that the women (and men) who applied for loans were those who considered 
they were likely to receive them. Thus, a relevant question in order to determine whether 
women are discriminated against or not is: what happened with those women who did not 
apply for loans?. They could simply have no demand for capital at the established interest 
rates, in which case there is no discrimination problem. However, there might be a group 
of women who wanted funds but considered they would not meet Caja Agraria’s  
requirements and thereby chose not to apply at all. The size of this group, relative to the 
equivalent among the men, could tell us a great deal. Moreover, it would be of great 
interest to find out whether those women’s assessments were correct—i.e., did they 
indeed not meet the requirements to obtain a loan from Caja Agraria? If their predictions 
were correct, this would signal that Caja Agraria is not meeting that sector’s needs. If 
their predictions were not correct, on the other hand, the problem is likely to be 
originated by inadequate information regarding Caja Agraria’s services (for instance, that 
they used information channels to which women do not have easy access). However, 
obtaining this type of information is obviously extremely difficult; therefore, an analysis 
of this sort is beyond the scope of this study.  
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needs in a sensible fashion. This is a significant problem, given that branch directors have 
a considerable amount of power and discretion at the local level. Some directors of Caja 
Agraria regard women as good clients; women exhibit good repayment behavior, and 
they are organized and responsible. However, this is not a widely held notion. In fact, in 
accordance with the prevailing cultural patterns, officials argue i) that women have no 
experience in income-generating activities and ii) that if women had received funds, they 
would likely hand them over to their partners (Pulido, 1997). 
 
Providing the guarantees required by Caja Agraria is also a problem. Most women do not 
own a piece of land that could be offered as collateral; they have difficulties finding 
guarantors; and very few of them operate through the FAG. In fact, those that make use 
of the guarantee fund are sometimes required, by officials from Caja Agraria, to provide 
collateral for the 20% of the loan not guaranteed by the FAG. 
 
One additional obstacle for women trying to operate with Caja Agraria stems from an 
internal norm that defines who is affected by loans granted to individuals (Decree Law 
2360 from 1993). Its Article 11 states that loans granted to wives/husbands, permanent 
companions, siblings, and close relatives such as siblings and brothers/sisters-in-law, are 
considered as granted to the same person. An arguably risk-reducing policy, this rule 
implies that an individual cannot receive funds from the Caja Agraria if s/he or any of 
her/his family members has failed to repay a loan in time. The article does not explicitly 
discriminate against women; however, current cultural and socioeconomic conditions 
result in men having a much larger share of Caja Agraria’s portfolio than women and, 
consequently, women are disproportionately affected by the regulation. 
 
5.2.2 Commercial Banks: Caja Social 
 
Commercial banks are, for the most part, absent from Colombian rural areas. I will, 
therefore, present only a brief description of a large urban-based commercial bank: Caja 
Social. This highly profitable and financially successful institution allocates a 
considerable share of its portfolio—as far as banks are concerned—to small loans. Its 
coverage is ample: in 1992 it reached over 120,000 clients through 128 office branches 
located in areas accessible to microentrepreneurs (Bonilla Castro, 1994). 
 
Table 5.4. displays information about the small loans granted by one Bogotá branch of 
Caja Social (La Candelaria) in one semester. Homogeneous credit policies across 
branches suggest that these results are representative of Caja Social as a whole. 
Nonetheless, regional variations are likely to arise due to socioeconomic and cultural 
differences  of the populations served by each branch. The number of men who received 
small loans exceeded the number of women by almost 19% (Table 5.4). It is worth 
noting, however, that the difference occurs mainly in the largest-loans category (loans 
within the US$3,750-5,000 range); the agency seems to be granting similar numbers of 
smaller loans (under US$3,750) to men and women. However, the category where the 
difference emerges accounts for over 45% of the small loans granted and, clearly, for a 
much higher share of the small loans’ portfolio. 
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Number of Loans  %  Loan Size 
(US$)  Men Women Total  Men Women Total 
< 625         2        2        4     0.85    0.85     1.71 
625 – 1,250       11      13      24     4.70    5.56   10.26 
1,250 – 2,500       32      30      62   13.68  12.82   26.50 
2,500 – 3,750       15      22      37     6.41    9.40   15.81 
3,750 – 5,000       79      28    107   33.76  11.97   45.73 
Total     139      95    234   59.40  40.60  100.0 
Source: Bonilla Castro (1994) 
* Data from the La Candelaria branch in Bogotá—Loans approved from June to November 1993. 
 
Caja Social grants loans by way of decentralized procedures that allow for fast loan 
approvals and disbursements. Additionally, they have more flexible collateral 
requirements. Although they sometimes require cosigners, clients’ savings and loan 
repayment histories are taken into consideration when approving loans. 
 
I lack information to comment on overall repayment rates relative to total portfolio and 
can examine only the distribution of delinquent loans by loan size and by sex of the 
beneficiaries. It is difficult to draw any conclusions from such a small sample—34 loans 
defaulted in one branch over a two-month period—but Table 5.5 shows that men have 
more delinquent loans than women for loans under US$2,000, while the opposite is true 
for loans in the US$3,000-5,000 range. If one keeps in mind that, according to Table 5.4, 
the number of men who received loans between US$3,750 and 5,000 is so much higher 
than the number of women, then women’s higher absolute number of delinquent loans is 
probably indicating a difference even larger in relative terms. However, as stated, the 
information available is not enough to reach clear conclusions in this regard. 
 
Table 5.5. Delinquency Rates (>90days) by Gender – Small Loans Portfolio 
Caja Social – 1993* 
 
Number of Delinquent 
Loans 
%  Loan Size 
(US$) 
Men Women Total  Men Women Total 
< 600        0       0        0       0      0      0 
600 – 1,000        3       2        5      8.82      5.88    14.71 
1,000 – 2,000        6       4      10    17.65    11.76    29.41 
2,000 – 3,000        4       5        9    11.76    14.71    26.47 
3,000 – 5,000        3       7      10      8.82    20.59    29.41 
Total      16     18      34    47.05    52.94  100.00 
Source: Bonilla Castro (1994) 
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Credit unions play a significant role in Colombia’s financial market. Even though this 
sector has recently experienced a severe crisis as a result of grave problems in some of 
the largest credit unions, today the system appears to have recuperated. The recovery is, 
at least partly, a result of a clearer and stricter supervision (Hauge, et al., 1999). Among 
the credit unions, I will take a glance at two successful institutions: Cupocrédito, one of 
the largest credit unions in Colombia; and Coopmujer, a smaller credit union that works 
exclusively with women. 
 
Cupocrédito has over 100 branch offices most of which are located in small cities. By 
1992, its membership was close to 300,000. Men tend to receive more loans than women 
in Cupocrédito but, given that they make no special effort to reach women, loans seem to 
be fairly evenly distributed between the two (Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6. Loan Distribution by Gender – Small Loans Portfolio – Cupocrédito – 1993 
 
Number of Loans  %  Loan Size 
(US$)  Men Women Total  Men Women Total 
< 1,247  35,209  29,914  65,123    41.09    34.91      76 
1,247 – 6,234  12,442    8,118  20,560    14.52     9.48      24 
Total  47,651  38,032  85,683    55.61   44.39    100 
Source: Bonilla Castro (1994). 
 
It is likely that women’s relatively high participation in Cupocrédito results, at least 
partially, from their flexibility regarding guarantees: loans are granted based on the 
member’s history in the institution, on her/his savings, and on cosigners—who are easier 
to obtain because after becoming a member of the credit union, one operates in a familiar 
environment. 
 
Table 5.7. Delinquency Rates (>90days) by Gender – Small Loans Portfolio 
Cupocrédito – 1993* 
 
Number of Loans  %  Loan Size 
(US$)  Men Women Total  Men Women  Total 
<  462  165 151 316 48.67  44.55  93.22 
462 – 923  9  6  15  2.65  1.77  4.42 
923  –  4619  5 3 8 1.48  0.88  2.36 
Total  179 160 339 52.80  47.20  100 
Source: Bonilla Castro (1994) 
* Data from the Suba-Rincón Bogotá branch, as of Dec. 31
st 1993. 
 
Once again, the information available to me was about the distribution of past due loans 
by loan size and by sex of the beneficiary. I do not have data on the share of past due 
loans on total portfolio, nor do I know the total number of loans granted. In consequence, 
it is difficult to evaluate portfolio quality and to provide a complete picture of what 
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Bogotá (Suba-Rincón) show fewer women than men defaulting loans. Yet, the 
differences do not appear to be significant.
16  
 
I will now turn to Coopmujer, the other credit union to be described in this review.
17 This 
institution has been operating since 1988 and has offices in San Gil and Bucaramanga. 
Coopmujer works exclusively with and for women: 100% of their clients and staff are 
women. It provides training on legal aspects, on cooperatives, and on gender issues, 
among other things. But Coopmujer’s main activity is to encourage savings and provide 
credit to microentrepreneurs or petty traders—particularly in the areas of cloth 
manufacturing, footwear, cheese, dairy, food, and crafts. Without sufficient capital of 
their own, these women had to resort to moneylenders and intermediaries in the past. 
Naturally, that substantially reduced the profitability of their enterprises and limited their 
opportunities to grow. Coopmujer does not subsidize interest rates. However high its 
rates may be, Coopmujer is still a more favorable option for women in the area. By  
December of 1997, more than 1,600 women had outstanding loans from Coopmujer. 
 
Coopmujer’s requirements for granting loans include: being members of the credit union 
for at least a month, paying member shares, presenting a national I.D. (cédula de 
ciudadanía), providing personal and commercial references, and a few other documents. 
Coopmujer does not ask for feasibility studies. Staff from the credit union interviews 
prospective borrowers and provides assistance whenever necessary—most women do not 
read or write. Although Coopmujer places a great deal of attention on client’s repayment 
capacity and arrearage, it sometimes requires collateral too. By the end of 1997, 9.8% of 
the loans granted with personal guarantees and 9% of the loans secured with physical 
collateral were past due. 
 
5.2.4. Microfinance Programs 
 
5.2.4.1. Group-based Programs: Programs using Solidarity Groups 
 
In view of the severe limitations that poor people face when they want to take loans from 
formal financial institutions because they lack the type of assets traditionally accepted as 
collateral, group-based credit methodologies would appear as a very desirable alternative 
for the Colombian case. As previously discussed, group-based methodologies provide a 
cheaper and more expeditious way to screen clients and monitor loan use and repayment. 
These features reduce lending and recovering costs, thereby expanding the pool of 
creditworthy clients and significantly favoring outreach. Nevertheless, one should be very 
careful when exporting this methodology to any new setting. 
 
I was not able to find any village banking experience in Colombia, but there were several 
urban-based institutions using the solidarity group approach. Results of applying this 
methodology have been varied and with different levels of success. 
                                                           
16 This may not be the case if we weigh those figures by the number of loans received in each category. 
17 This information is based on a conversation with Maria Luisa Mendez Romero, Manager of Coopmujer. 
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The solidarity group approach is based on the premise that group members know each 
other, have strong ties, and can monitor each others’ behavior. Moreover, it strongly 
relies on the notions that: 
i)  social norms within the community are strong enough and can be enforced in such 
a way that nobody would purposely default a loan and hurt other members of the 
group; 
ii)  it is in each person’s best interest to do everything possible to ensure total loan 
repayment, including repaying other members’ debt, so that their own future 
access to credit is not damaged. 
 
Even though these notions would, for the most part, be valid across Colombia, some 
factors could threaten the success of this type of program. With respect to the first point, 
for instance, it is essential to keep in mind that migration is very high in some areas as a 
consequence of severe economic problems and lack of security due to guerillas and/or 
paramilitary groups. This obviously harms the stability of some groups and communities. 
Additionally, certain right-wing groups oppose any sort of group formation, while some 
left-wing groups encourage the sabotage of this type of program, arguing that they 
employ foreign capital and their ultimate goal is to favor investors from imperialist 
societies. 
 
In regard to the second point, the higher the default rate within a group is, the heavier is 
the burden for the remaining “good” members. As default rates increase, it becomes more 
and more difficult for those “good” members to cover their partners’ default. If the 
situation is not fixed early enough, it becomes easier for them to be “corrupted” and not 
repay their loans either. This problem snowballs until the debt left is such that those 
members still in the group cannot (even if they had wished to) repay the total loan. 
Eventually, even the “good” clients are added to the list of “undesirable clients” (within 
the organization but also nationwide), drastically affecting their future access to capital, 
even when they have paid proportionally more than their own share (ANMUCIC, 1998). 
 
Some of the institutions that have been successfully applying the solidarity group 
methodology in the northern and central regions of Colombia are: Actuar Atlántico, 
Actuar Bolivar, Actuar Caldas, Actuar Quindio, Actuar Risaralda and Actuar Tolima (all 
of them affiliated to ACCION International),
18 Fundación Amanecer, Fundación Caicedo 
González, Fundación Mario Santo Domingo, Fundación San Isidro, Fundecor, and 
Fundicar. These institutions are also applying other lending methodologies but, in all 
cases, a substantial part of their portfolio is dedicated to solidarity groups. 
 
Table 5.8. presents some basic figures describing these institutions. It is comforting to see 
that, with the exception of Actuar Risaralda, all of them have been very successful in 
reaching women. In fact, for most of these institutions, women represent at least 60% of 
their clientele. The figures for Fundación Mario Santo Domingo and for Actuar Atlántico 
are remarkable as far as women’s outreach is concerned (79% and 90%, respectively). 
                                                           
18 ACCION International is a non-profit organization dedicated to promote the use of solidarity groups in 
order to reach the poorest sectors. 
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employ, of the size of the loans they grant, and of the number of women in their staff; 
except for one case, more than 50% of their employees are women.  
 
Table 5.8. Data on some Financial Institutions using the Solidarity Group Methodology 
November 1996 
 















Actuar Atlántico – Atlántico 
 
    1087       90   124,035  1  67 
Actuar Bolivar – Bolivar 
 
        67       64     69,267  1  64 
Actuar Caldas – Caldas 
 
    1200       47  232,825  4  60 
Actuar Quindio(**)-Quindio 
 
     NA      NA       90,924  1  63 
Actuar Risaralda – Risaralda 
 
      557       37       66,657  1  59 
Actuar Tolima – Tolima 
 
    4287       61  2,010,991  4  55 
Fundación Amanecer – 
Casanare 
    1068       63  126,616  5  63 
Fundación Caicedo 
Gonzalez – Valle del Cauca 
      465       61  53,873  9  60 
Fundación Mario Santo  
Domingo – Atlántico 
    9732       79  1,955,826  3  54 
Fundación San Isidro – 
Córdoba 
      231       65  100,740  1  56 
Fundecor – Córdoba 
 
    1077       52  100566  1  31 
Fundicar – Guajira 
 
    5354       69  452,444  5  54 
(*) in thousands of Colombian Pesos 
(**) Actuar Quindio and Fundecor also have programs for women that are household heads 
 
These figures alone are very encouraging, but a quick comparison between the portfolio 
and outreach of these programs and those from the Caja Agraria reinforces the case for 
reaching women via solidarity groups. The results displayed by these NGOs are very 
promising, but they are still highly localized and isolated efforts. Their coverage is 
limited because these institutions depend, at least to some extent, on international funds 
which have become more difficult to obtain (donor countries have reduced their budgets 
for this type of aid, and the demand for funds has increased substantially after the 
opening of the Eastern European block). On the other hand, since these NGOs are not 
authorized to take savings, they cannot expand their portfolio by capturing local money. 
 
5.2.4.2. Individual-based Programs 
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the individual-based credit programs that have most successfully reached women in 
Colombia. They are urban-based organizations committed to reaching 
microentrepreneurs, and especially women, located in: Bogotá, Bucaramanga, Cali, 
Medellín, and Popayán. Table 5.9 presents a summary of the indicators most relevant for 
this study. Given its outstanding performance, the rest of the section will concentrate on 
WWB-Cali, the first one to be created. 
 























Bogotá 1,624  4,803  340  75.0  4.42  320 
Bucaramanga 2,039  4,757  430  72.9  2.30  340 
Cali  7,318     13,631  540  68.9  1.45  401 
Medellín 2,015  4,456  450 57.8  3.49 279 
Popayán   3,421  7,093  480  71.6  1.85  373 
Total    16,417     34,740  470  69.4  2.20  354 
Source: Colombian Association of Institutions Affiliated with WWB. 
 
WWB-Cali, founded in 1982, was the first Colombian institution affiliated with 
Women’s World Banking. It was also the first institution worldwide to receive loans from 
WWB International. WWB-Cali first started as a group of professional women offering 
advice and help to other women. Over time, they received support from international 
agencies and were thus able to provide financial assistance and other badly needed 
services. WWB-Cali granted loans to small urban enterprises using the solidarity group 
methodology but, unfortunately, it was ill prepared for that type of venture. For one thing, 
WWB-Cali only managed small funds, which implied a severely restricted lending 
capacity. For another, it did not have a good information system, nor did it have sufficient 
and adequately trained staff; therefore it was extremely difficult to detect problems on 
time. To complicate matters, migration from rural areas to poor outskirts of the city was 
remarkably high, and the guerrilla had persuaded people not to repay loans that were the 
product of foreign capital investments. As a consequence of all these, the program could 
not continue operating in the same fashion, and the board decided to implement drastic 
changes.  
 
With support from the IDB and the GTZ, WWB-Cali switched from a group-based to an 
individual-based lending methodology, implemented a very complete and efficient 
computer system, and trained credit officers. By July 1998, WWB-Cali covered the Cali 
area with 6 office branches in the urban area, a US$9,000,000 portfolio, and 14,500 
outstanding loans. Thus the Cali area; a region where no commercial banks provided 
microcredit, could receive it from WWB-Cali. 
 
Once WWB-Cali considers that someone has the potential to become a client, it assigns 
them an analyst who visits their house and business and helps them prepare all the 
   46necessary documentation. For smaller loans, WWB-Cali requires a national I.D. (cédula 
de ciudadanía) and an evaluation of the enterprise; for larger loans, it asks for a cosigner 
and a good credit history within the institution. Once a loan application is approved, the 
funds are available within 24 hours. The WWB-Cali loan granting procedure is based on 
rewarding a good credit history: clients start with loans under US$500 (typically of 
around US$250) for 4 to 6 months; if they exhibit a good repayment behavior, they are 
rewarded with immediate approval of larger loans that can gradually increase up to about 
US$13,000 and longer terms that can go up to 48 months (Plata, 1998). 
 
Loans include paid and mandatory technical assistance designed to aid 
microentrepreneurs in the financial management of their enterprises. Payments are 
monthly, for the most part, and have to be done at WWB-Cali’s offices. Interest rates, 
which are not subsidized, are approximately 3% monthly (plus 0.75% for technical 
assistance, in the case of new clients). Over time, and after a good repayment behavior is 
observed, loan size is increased and the cost of technical assistance is reduced. As a 
result, the interest rates charged are similar for both large and small loans, the difference 
being mostly due to charges related to technical assistance. 
 
WWB-Cali’s statute requires that women comprise at least two thirds of its clientele but, 
according to its executive director, they never resorted to special policies in order to 
reach that goal. In fact, around 70% of its clients are typically women. WWB-Cali does 
not offer any special treatment for women, nor does it discriminate in their favor. The 
high proportion of women among their clients results from the fact that WWB-Cali 
serves one of the poorest economic groups, and it is in those groups that women tend to 
appear as economic actors (Plata, 1998). At the same time, although WWB-Cali’s name 
does not prevent men from working with the institution, it certainly encourages women to 
participate. Other important factors that explain this positive result include their very 
friendly treatment of clients and the fact that women who have had positive experiences 
encourage other (female) friends or relatives to work with WWB-Cali. 
 
As in most institutions, the women’s average loan is lower than the men’s (Plata, 1998). 
This could be because women take smaller loans (they borrow for smaller enterprises or 
they are more averse to taking risks). However, it is more likely to reflect the fact that 
there is a higher proportion of women among new clients—who, because of the lending 
methodology based on credit history, receive smaller loans. In regard to repayment rates, 
WWB-Cali finds no significant difference between men’s and women’s behavior; in all 
cases, the default levels are extremely low (Plata, 1998). 
 
WWB-Cali is able to offer appropriate services with a very low total operating cost. This 
is partly because the staff and the credit officers have access to timely and accurate 
information—it runs very efficient portfolio, operations, and accounting computer 
systems. Another very important factor contributing to WWB-Cali’s good results is the 
adequately trained team of credit officers who work within a very well designed 
framework of responsibilities and incentives. Once a credit officer recommends a loan, 
s/he is also in charge of providing the technical assistance and, especially, of recovering 
the loan. To prevent clients from falling behind with their payments, at the end of the 
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so that they can visit those clients the following day (Plata, 1998). There are significant 
incentives for credit officers to maintain a healthy portfolio, as approximately 30% of 
their earnings is based on the quality of  their portfolio (theirs, their agencies’, and the 
overall foundation’s). Quality of portfolio is rated according to the number of loans 
granted, the outstanding portfolio, and the delinquency rates. Consequently, credit 
officers have incentives to maintain a healthy portfolio and expand their outreach; at the 
same time, they are motivated enough to help other credit officers and to work in teams. 
Efficient information systems, together with the incentives schemes, translate into a very 
high loans/credit officer ratio of over 400 and very low rates of default. 
 
WWB-Cali has embarked on plans for a very accelerated growth. By the year 2000, 
WWB-Cali plans to have 12 office branches and to be able to reach 90,000 clients. 
Obviously, this rapid growth increases pressure for it to become a formal (and therefore 
regulated) financial institution. However, at least for the time being, the board has 
decided against taking that step (Plata, 1998). 
 
In regard to geographical coverage, WWB-Cali is interested in expanding its service to 
very small towns but it does not serve the rural sector now, nor is it planning on doing so 
in the near future. According to its executive director, working with rural clients would 
require expensive adjustments to their technology. Some of the problems of working in 
rural areas are: very high levels of violence; low levels of commitment in some groups, 
where members could simply decide to break their pledge and not to repay their loans; 
and acute transportation problems that would affect both credit officers and potential 
clients. For WWB-Cali, extending their services to rural areas would require 
guaranteeing a minimum of security; educating people that although it is a foundation, it 
does not give money away; and changing loan terms, repayment systems, and evaluation 
of repayment likelihood, among other things. In other words, WWB-Cali could provide 
services in rural areas, but at this point it would be too costly. 
 
SECTION VI: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The design of policies to succesfully improve rural women’s socioeconomic status in 
Colombia will require a more careful and informed understanding of their current 
position. An obvious first step in that direction would be to reinforce and expand policies 
oriented to obtain regional and national data disaggregated by sex.  Sharp differences 
across regions in Colombia imply that any serious attempt to expand financial 
institutions’ outreach must be based on a combination of policies and programs flexible 
enough to respond to the geographical, cultural, and social needs of the different sectors. 
 
Nevertheless, more poor rural women could be reached via actions in at least two 
different fronts. On the one hand, it is important to promote the creation and expansion of 
microfinance NGOs and other finance institutions that are “friendlier to women.” 
Measures to be considered include: 
   48i)  attenuating the cost of reaching new geographic areas or more disperse 
populations by subsidizing the acquisition of office space in rural areas that these 
institutions were not covering and of motorcycles or other small vehicles; 
ii)  encouraging the expansion of their services to new customers of a specific profile 
by subsidizing transaction costs (not interest rates)—this could be done, for 
instance, in the form of a fixed transfer to the institution for each new (female) 
client below the poverty line; 
iii)  improving microfinance institutions’ sustainability (and encouraging their 
growth) by allowing them to capture local savings. 
 
However, given the magnitude of Caja Agraria’s portfolio and its wide geographical 
coverage, it is clear that a significantly larger impact in reaching poor rural women could 
be achieved via adjustments in the way the Caja Agraria operates. Suggestions in this 
regard include: 
i)  making all the relevant information concerning programs and requirements as 
easily and widely available as possible. This could improve women’s access to 
the Caja Agraria in two ways: 
-  women may have better chances to learn about the resources available to them 
if that information is distributed via channels that are more likely to reach 
women; 
-  credit officers would not be able to add arbitrary requirements nor would 
loans be framed as “favors” (which most women feel they cannot repay) if the 
conditions for taking loans are clearly known (by, for instance, posting clear 
signs in all branches of Caja Agraria); 
ii)  providing training and organizing workshops designed to convince credit officers 
that women are potentially desirable clients and that they should be treated 
accordingly; 
iii)  accepting less-traditional forms of collateral; 
iv)  establishing a clearer link between the Caja Agraria and the FAG, and training 
Caja Agraria’s personnel on how to make better use of the resources administered 
by the FAG; 
v)  reducing the burden of applying for loans by simplifying the procedures—
decentralizing at least part of the loan-granting process may be necessary. 
  
Finally, in order to address the notion that enhancing women’s access to capital could be 
a cost-effective way of inducing economic growth or reducing poverty in rural Colombia, 
future research should examine intrahousehold dynamics in the region. That is, there is a 
need for better knowledge of the ways in which families allocate their income and 
resources and of how they make those decisions in this specific setting. That information 
will shed light on the household decision-making model that more appropriately 
describes these families’ behavior and will provide and idea of the types of results to be 
expected from enhancing women’s access to capital. 
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Households can be thought of as microeconomic units which, through their production 
and consumption decisions, choose how to best allocate their resources (labor, assets, 
etc.). These production and consumption decisions are particularly related in agricultural 
households. Chayanov’s pioneering work, in the 1920s, gave origin to an extensive 
literature and a variety of models on peasant household behavior. He portrayed the 
peasant household as a unit that decided how much family labor to commit to production 
in order to maximize family well-being or “utility.” In his representation, the level of 
utility that a family achieves is positively related to the amount of goods that it consumes 
and negatively related to the amount of family work that it expends. In Chayanov’s 
peasant household, an increase in the amount of family labor used had two opposite 
effects: it allowed the household to produce more and, as a consequence, to consume 
more goods, thereby increasing the level of utility it enjoyed; while, at the same time, the 
additional work decreased the household’s utility because peasants were “drudgery 
averse” (Chayanov, 1966; Ellis, 1988 ). 
 
Portraying peasant households as units pursuing multiple goals—as opposed to pure 
producers or pure consumers—complicates the task considerably.  However, this 
additional complexity may help explain the crucial link between demand and supply-side 
responses to policy changes, especially in the presence of incomplete markets. A certain 
policy could, for instance, affect the amount of labor the household supplies to the market 
(supply-side response) and/or it could affect the demand for inputs and goods (demand-
side response).  
 
There exists a wide variety of policy instruments aiming to achieve desired economic, 
health, and/or educational goals by changing the economic conditions under which 
households from specific sectors of the population make decisions. However, it is 
impossible to predict what the outcome of applying any of these policies would be 
without a more in-depth understanding on how families make decisions. As Doss (1994) 
points out, some extremely important issues to explore are: 
 How are individual preferences aggregated within the household? In other words, 
does it make sense to talk about “household preferences” or do we need to 
consider each person’s preference separately? 
 Are decisions made at household or at individual level? 
 Do all members of the household pool their incomes? 
 Do they pool their resources (labor, assets, etc.)? 
 
Numerous models of household behavior have been designed which take as their starting 
assumptions the different possible answers to these questions. There are two dominant 
approaches in the economic study of intrahousehold decision-making: 
i)  models that consider the household as a single decision-maker (unitary models); 
and, 
ii)  models that view the household as a collection of individuals that both cooperate 
and may have conflicting interests (collective models). 
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A.1. Unitary Models 
 
Unitary models assume that:  
i)  the household has only one set of preferences (or at least that it could be treated as 
if it did); and,  
ii)  individuals’ assets, labor, income, and information are fully shared within the 
household.  
 
A household may, according to this approach, be treated as a unit that combines its 
members’ resources and incomes, making production and consumption decisions in order 
to maximize its (the household’s) utility. For simplicity of exposition, I will concentrate 
the discussion of unitary models on their assumption of a household utility (or welfare) 
function. Two different sets of arguments have been used to justify this assumption: 
a)  All household members have the same set of preferences. If preferences are common 
to all members within the household, optimal decisions at the household level would 
exactly mirror each member’s optimal decisions; or, 
b)  Household members have different preferences but their preferences can somehow be 
aggregated. Special rules governing household behavior have been suggested to 
indicate how (and why) preferences can be aggregated:  
1)  There is a benevolent dictator who acts unilaterally and makes decisions taking 
everybody’s preferences into account; or 
2) Perfect  altruism  within the family guarantees that household members 
“subordinate their individual inclinations to the pursuit of common household 
goals” (Ellis, 1993:181). 
 
The first justification, namely that all household members will have the same set of 
preferences, seems very unrealistic and will not be further discussed.
19 And, 
unfortunately, the benevolent dictator rule (justification b.1) only holds under very 
restrictive assumptions (Haddad et al., 1997). If, on the other hand, rural households were 
made up of members, with differing preferences, that make decisions under purely 
altruistic motives (justification b.2), there would be no need for programs that target 
women specifically.  It would suffice to implement programs which are designed to 
improve poor households’ access to loans. In that case, households with a female head 
(which are often towards the poorest end of the wealth spectrum) would benefit from 
programs of this kind; and in households where a male member is present, the latter could 
obtain a loan under the program with which he would, presumably, do what is best for his 
family. 
 
Unitary models, however, have been widely criticized for not taking into consideration 
that preferences may, in fact, not only be different across family members—in particular 
between men and women—but, moreover, they may not be aggregated in any simple 
way. In addition, besides assuming that families maximize a unique “utility function”, 
unitary models assume that the function to be maximized does not change over time or 
across households. (Folbre, 1984). 
                                                           
19 For an empirical study on preference heterogeneity within the household see Barham and Kusago (1996). 
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A.2. Collective Models   
 
A number of neoclassical economists have addressed the problems of working with 
immutable “household preferences” by modeling the household as a collection of 
individuals with their own preferences. Instead of assuming that those individual 
preferences are automatically aggregated at the household level, they dwell on the 
process by which this aggregation occurs.  In collective household decision-making 
models, household well-being (or utility) depends not only on relative prices and incomes 
(as in the unitary models) but also on its members’ individual preferences and their 
relative bargaining power. 
 
Models in this class can be grouped into two main categories: 
i)  models that describe household behavior as the outcome of a cooperative 
bargaining process; and,  
ii)  models that explain household behavior as the result of non-cooperative games. 
 
A.2.1. Cooperative Bargaining Models    
 
The cooperative bargaining approach starts from the underlying notion that individuals 
choose to “become a household” only if they are better off by acting together than they 
would otherwise be using their own assets, labor, and income individually (Haddad et al., 
1997; McElroy, 1990; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Manser and Brown, 1990; Schultz, 
1990; Thomas, 1990).  The important assumptions in this group of models are:  
i)  Families have clear and enforceable sharing rules or “contracts” that establish 
how decisions are to be made;  
ii)  Family members pool their income; and,  
iii)  Household decisions are made in such a way that no member could be made 
better off without making the other members worse off (household decisions are 
“Pareto-efficient”). A family makes Pareto-efficient production decisions if their 
members cannot produce more of one good without decreasing the production of 
another.
20 A family makes Pareto-efficient consumption decisions if all produced 
and purchased goods are distributed among family members in such a way that no 
one could be better off without making someone else worse off. 
 
Economists who consider household behavior as the result of a cooperative process, have 
followed two different paths to model the household decision-making process: 
i)  One group assumes that families make Pareto-efficient production and 
consumption decisions but they make no a priori assumption about the process 
how does decisions are made. Instead, they derive the sharing rule that explains 
intrahousehold allocations from the data (Haddad et al., 1997; Chiappori 1988; 
Browning et al. 1993; Browning and Chiappori 1995). 
ii)  The other group explicitly establishes the household decision-making process. 
That is, they define how the individuals bargain to make “household decisions,” 
and what those decisions would be if no agreements were reached. Thus, in these 
                                                           
20 Or, equivalently, the household is producing on the frontier of its production possibility set. 
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positions.” Fall-back positions are affected by economic opportunities, and 
institutional, cultural, social, and legal factors.
21 
 
For this second set of models, individuals’ bargaining power (or influence in the 
bargaining process) is directly related to how much access to or control over economic 
resources they have. That is, the more access to land, capital, jobs, etc., an individual has, 
the more her/his preferences will count in household decisions. As a result, any change 
that favors one member’s economic position relative to the other’s, affects individuals’ 
bargaining power and, consequently, alters household decisions. This is a crucial feature 
because it allows for different household decisions depending on who has access to and 
control over economic resources. In other words, changes in who has access to and 
control over resources may affect household decisions even if the resources available to 
the household as a whole have not changed (Katz, 1992; Doss, 1994).  
 
Although cooperative models are still based on controversial assumptions (enforceable 
contracts, fully pooled income, and Pareto-Efficient decisions), they represent an 
improvement over unitary models. Cooperative models of intrahousehold decision-
making allow for differences in preferences and power across family members; and 
incorporate the notion that individuals’ bargaining power is affected not only by market 
forces (prices and income) as in the unitary models but also by other factors
22 which 
affect family members’ fall-back positions and therefore their opportunity cost of 
cooperation. 
 
A.2.2. Non-cooperative Bargaining Models 
 
Among the Collective models, the “non-cooperative bargaining” approach may constitute 
a particularly attractive alternative to modeling household decision-making. Non-
cooperative models relax three restrictive assumption on which cooperative models are 
based: 
i)  they do not assume enforceable contracts amongst players—allowing for a more 
accurate representation of the informal nature of spouses’ day-to-day decisions on 
how to allocate resources and income (Haddad, 1997 et al.; Harsanyi and Selton, 
1988; Wooley, 1988; Binmore and Dasgupta, 1987); 
ii)  they do not assume that income is pooled—this is a highly desirable property 
given most empirical findings; 
iii)  they do not impose Pareto-efficiency in production or consumption decisions. 
 
                                                           
21 Initially, fall-back positions were modeled as the situation in which individuals would be in if they would 
have been divorced. However, divorce does not constitute a credible threat for day-to-day decisions 
(Wooley, 1988). In 1993, Lundberg and Pollack developed the “separate spheres model” in which 
individuals’ allocation of labor and income at the fall-back position are based on culture-specific gender 
roles.  
22 McElroy and Horney called these additional factors extrahousehold environmental parameters (EEP). 
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collective models) and to make decisions based on their own access to resources. 
Families are viewed as fairly independent and gender-specific subeconomies linked by 
“reciprocal claims” of members on each others assets, labor, and income (Haddad, et al., 
1997; Katz, 1992).  
 
Family decision-making is modeled, in this school of thought, by combining the result of 
each family member’s best response to what they assume their partner’s would do. There 
is a wide range of non-cooperative bargaining household models depending on: 
i)  the manner in which spouses assumptions about each other’s behavior are 
modeled (using Cournot-Nash solutions, Rational Conjectures, etc.); and, 
ii)  the manner in which family members interaction is modeled (using, for instance, 
transfers of labor and income between spouses, or individual preferences that 
include the other spouse’s well-being, etc.) (Carter and Katz, 1997, Kanbur, 1991; 
Wooley, 1988; Ulph, 1980). 
 
A.3. Which Model Should Be Used? 
 
The predicted effects of different economic or social policies on household behavior 
depend on the way intrahousehold decision-making is modeled. Which of the types of 
models presented here should be used? There is no easy answer. As it will be shown 
below, the assumptions of the unitary models have been rejected by most empirical 
evidence. However, the additional data requirements and complexity of the more flexible 
models may not be justified if the gains in predictive power are not substantial. This 
argument is often used by researchers who choose to ignore what happens within the 
household. 
 
How households make decisions, and therefore how reasonable the assumptions of these 
models are, depends considerably on the region, the time period, and the group being 
studied. Nonetheless, a brief look at empirical evidence in the literature may shed some 
light on the appropriateness of the assumptions in which these models are grounded. 
 
A-1) Homogeneous preferences. Men and women in rural settings frequently differ in 
how they allocate their income. Mencher (1988) and Whitehead (1981) found differences 
in the degree to which men and women use their own earnings as personal spending 
money to satisfy their children’s demands, their own self image, and their perception of 
what society expects from them. There is also evidence that women dedicate a large 
portion of their income to everyday subsistence and family nutrition in Guatemala, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Ghana, St. Lucia (Blumberg, 1986; Horton and Miller, 1987; Carloni, 
1987; Tripp, 1981; Knudsen and Yates, 1981; Dwyer and Bruce, 1988). Several studies 
have found that while there was a positive relation between children’s nutritional levels 
and mothers’ income in India, children’s nutritional level did not increase proportionally 
with fathers’ income (Kumar, 1977).  
 
A-2) Income Pooling. Although there obviously are households where income is pooled, 
such households are not the norm. Empirical evidence has found that, not only 
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limited knowledge of their partners’ financial affairs (Fapohunda, 1988; Safilios-
Rothschild, 1988).  
 
A-3) Pareto-efficient production decisions (household production cannot be increased by 
a mere reallocation of resources, without making some family members worse off). Two 
studies that found Pareto-inefficient production decisions at household level are Udry 
(1996) and Jones (1983). Udry (1996) finds that, in a region of Burkina Faso, crop yields 
for plots controlled by men are different from crop yields for plots controlled by women; 
and, that the household could produce more if some of the labor and fertilizer used for 
men’s plots is reallocated to women’s plots. Jones (1983), looked at Cameroon, and 
found that men and women were not maximizing household’s income but rather they 
were both maximizing their own individual incomes. Women preferred to work on, less 
remunerative, sorghum fields than working for their husbands’, more remunerative, rice 
fields. Working for their husbands will imply that women would not perceive any 
payment and any additional income would belong to the men. 
  
A-4) Pareto-efficient consumption decisions (household well-being cannot be improved 
by altering the composition and distribution of the bundle of goods consumed, without 
making some family members worse off). Thomas and Chen (1994) and Bourgoinon et al 
(1993) found Pareto-efficient outcomes on the consumption side. 
 
At this point, there is no conclusive evidence on whether or not household decisions are 
Pareto-efficient.
23 Further work is particularly needed in this area. If enough evidence of 
Pareto-inefficient household decisions is found, the effect of policies on household 
behavior may be significantly different from what the unitary or cooperative bargaining 
models would predict. In that case, non-cooperative bargaining models of household 
behavior become a crucial tool because “intrahousehold inefficiencies” would affect 
household behavior and, as a result, it would matter who in the household receives new 
access to economic resources--in this case capital.  
 
Increased economic opportunities for women—in terms of additional access to and 
control over resources, or an autonomous source of income—are expected to improve 
women’s fall-back position and, as a consequence, to improve their bargaining power 
within the household. Under the non-cooperative bargaining scenario, women-targeted 
programs—and, in particular for this study, women-targeted credit programs—could 
have desirable impacts even for those households in which male partners could, in 
principle, mediate capital to women whenever direct market provision failed them. 
 
Moreover, credit programs that specifically target women may, via improvements in 
women’s bargaining power, have positive effects on household production and 
                                                           
23 It is important to keep in mind that the Pareto-efficient consumption decisions and the Pareto-inefficient 
production decisions cited above do not belong to the same studies (or set of households) (Doss, 1994). 
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and family health care) whether or not women actually take a loan.
24  
 
If that were the case, credit programs that target poor women could represent 
improvements over programs that simply target poor households by reducing household 
inefficiencies. Thus, they may be a cost-effective way to induce economic growth or to 
improve nutrition, health, and education indicators. 
                                                           
24 Parallel examples are: policies that increase women’s wages will affect women’s bargaining power and 
household behavior even in households where women do not engage in wage employment (Doss and 
Senauer, 1994); or child-care subsidies such that if the couple is divorced are always given to the woman, 
will affect households’ decisions even when the couple is not divorced (Lundberg and Pollack, 1997). 
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